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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME (UNEP) IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Carol Annette Petsonk*
INTRODUCTION
A marked change in the language of debate on international and
national security has taken place in the past decade. In the interna-
tional arena, the importance of economic as well as military stability is
now recognized. In the last three years, environmental concerns have
emerged as a major theme.'
The ideal of competitiveness still dominates discussion in the military
and economic spheres. But competition is not the optimal paradigm for
environmental negotiations. While military competition can lead to a
stable result (e.g., balance of terror) and economic competition remains
the grail of trade negotiations, environmental stability requires
* J.D., Harvard Law School. Ms. Petsonk served as Associate Programme Officer
in the Environmental Law Unit of the United Nations Environment Programme from
1987-89. The views expressed here are those of the author in her personal capacity.
1. See Mathews, Redefining Security, 68 FOREIGN AFF. 2, 162-77 (1989) (sug-
gesting the broadening of the definition of national security to encompass resource,
environmental, and demographic issues); see also Martz, The Green Summit, NEWs-
WEEK, July 24, 1989, 12, 12 (noting that "[flor the first time the environment stood at
stage center in the world economy" during the 1989 summit of the seven industrial
powers); Beardsley, Greening the Summit: The Environment Arrives on the Interna-
tional Political Agenda, Sci. Am., Sept. 1989, at 17 (reporting that the Group of Seven
during their July 1989 meeting identified the need to safeguard the environment as one
of the three main challenges facing the international community).
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cooperation.
International legal instruments, including binding conventions, proto-
cols, and nonbinding guidelines, constitute increasingly important
mechanisms for achieving bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the
field of the environment.2 Because there is no global entity with power
to enforce such instruments, their effectiveness depends on voluntary
compliance.
One factor favoring compliance is the current resurgence in environ-
mental awareness at both national and international levels. The inter-
play between environmental and economic considerations also affects
compliance. Short-term economic imperatives may undermine compli-
ance, resulting in long-term environmental damage. Environmental pro-
tection measures may inadvertently foster black markets3 or operate as
unfair trade barriers,4 further hampering compliance. Observed
changes in environmental quality can provide a yardstick for measuring
the effectiveness of international environmental instruments.5
Since its inception in 1972, the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme (UNEP) has played a significant role in the development of
international environmental law. It has negotiated and obtained adop-
tion of nearly thirty binding multilateral instruments, 6 including the
2. See International Legal Instruments in the Field of the Environment, Decision
15/31 of the Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme (May
25, 1989) [hereinafter UNEP GC Decision 15/31], reprinted in United Nations Envi-
ronment Programme: Report of the Governing Council on the work of its fifteenth
session, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 25) Annex I at 158, U.N. Doc. A/44/25 (1989)
[hereinafter UNEP GC Fifteenth Session Report]. Nineteen multilateral legal instru-
ments entered into force between May 1986 and June 1989. UNEP GC Decision 15/
31, supra, para. 1(a). Ten multilateral legal instruments were adopted between May
1987 and November 1988. Id.; see also Progress in the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes, Decision 15/33 of the Governing Council of the
United Nations Environment Programme (May 25, 1989) [hereinafter UNEP GC De-
cision 15/33], reprinted in UNEP GC Fifteenth Session Report, supra, at 160 (taking
note of the adoption of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Move-
ments of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal).
3. See Trail of Shame: Behind the Ivory Trade, ASIAWEEK, Aug. 5, 1988, at 18,
39 (noting that a total ban on ivory trade could force the business underground,
thereby providing no possibility for monitoring).
4. Cf. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. vol. 5,
A60, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 262 (original text), 4 General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents 37 (1969) (current
text, as amended) [hereinafter GATT].
5. Cf. Commoner, A Reporter at Large: The Environment, NEw YORKER, June
15, 1987 (analyzing the efficacy of a decade of environmental legislation in the United
States as measured by changes in concentrations of particular environmental
pollutants).
6. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing multilateral instruments
pertaining to the environment); infra notes 7, 31, 32, & 39-47 and accompanying text
(addressing specific conventions and protocols).
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landmark 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol),7 as well as ten sets of nonbinding
environmental law guidelines and principles. UNEP serves as secreta-
riat to a number of environmental conventions, offers technical assis-
tance to developing countries in the formulation of environmental legis-
lation, and publishes a set of reference texts for international
environmental law scholars and practitioners.
Part I of this article describes in greater detail UNEP's activities in
the field of international environmental law. Part II examines the
evolution of UNEP's approach to this field and the effectiveness of its
approach in promoting protection of the ozone layer, environmentally
sound management of hazardous wastes, and exchange of information
on chemicals in international trade. This evaluation reveals that UNEP
has negotiated a large number of agreements with scientific, legal, and
political acumen. It argues that UNEP's approach could be more effec-
tive, however, if it systematically included economic incentives8 and ef-
7. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, adopted and
opened for signature Sept. 16, 1987, (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989), reprinted in
UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, MONTREAL PROTOCOL ON SUBSTANCES
THAT DEPLETE THE OZONE LAYER: FINAL ACT (1987), and in 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987)
[hereinafter Montreal, Protocol]. The Montreal Protocol is a protocol to the Vienna
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, adopted and opened for signature
Mar. 22, 1985 (entered into force Sept. 22, 1988), reprinted in UNITED NATIONS ENVI-
RONMENT PROGRAMME, VIENNA CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE OZONE
LAYER: FINAL ACT (1985), and in 26 I.L.M. 1516 (1987) [hereinafter Vienna Conven-
tion] (reprinting text of Convention only); see Register of International Treaties and
Other Agreements in the Field of the Environment, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC.15/Inf.2, at
221 (May 1989) (available from UNEP) [hereinafter Register of Treaties] (summa-
rizing the Montreal Protocol and Vienna Convention and providing signatory and rati-
fication data).
8. The author uses the term "economic incentives" to mean legal mechanisms
which seek to channel economically motivated behavior in market-based or centrally
administered systems into environmentally sound activity. Such mechanisms might in-
clude entitlements, taxes, marketable permits, bargaining structures, competitive mar-
kets for environmentally friendly products and the like. F. ANDERSON, ET AL., ENVI-
RONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES (1977); Stewart,
Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 153 (1988).
Some in the environmental community might protest that such incentives amount to
licensing pollution. No assertion is made here that market mechanisms without more
can or should control environmental considerations; rather, it is because markets often
favor economic degradation that their pressures need to be channeled toward environ-
mentally sound ends. A. BLINDER, HARD HEADS, SOFT HEARTS: TOUGH-MINDED ECO-
NOMICS FOR A JUST SOCIETY 136-59 (1987). Others would argue that market-based
controls are fundamentally undemocratic. See, e.g., J. DRYZEK, RATIONAL ECOLOGY:
ENVIRONMENT AND POLITICAL ECONOMY (1989) (arguing against such controls and in
favor of mediated solutions). Economic incentives, if carefully designed, can in fact
increase the transparency of control structures and enhance public participation in en-
vironmental preservation. Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law:. The
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ficacy monitoring mechanisms in the legal instruments it develops. Part
III comments briefly on the need for UNEP to take particular account
of economic considerations as it develops future conventions on preser-
vation of biological diversity and global climate change. In the area of
climate, Part III introduces the idea of an international emissions
credit bank as one possible mechanism for providing economic incen-
tives and for monitoring the efficacy of control measures.
I. UNEP'S ACTIVITIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. HISTORY
The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) established UNEP
in December 1972" following the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment (Stockholm Conference).10 The purpose of the
new organization was to "promote international co-operation in the
field of the environment and to recommend, as appropriate, policies to
this end, [and] to provide general policy guidance for the direction and
coordination of environmental programmes within the United Nations
system."'" The UNGA established the UNEP secretariat "to serve as a
focal point for environmental action and co-ordination within the
United Nations system." 2 UNEP serves as the central catalyzing and
coordinating body in the field of the environment within the UN sys-
tem. 3 UNEP has a mandate to pay special attention to the situation of
Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988).
9. See Institutional and Financial Arrangements for International Environmental
Co-operation, G.A. Res. 2997, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 43, U.N. Doe. No.
A/8730 (1972) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 2997] (calling for the implementation of mea-
sures to safeguard and promote environmental quality).
10. Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, reprinted in Report of the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14
and Corr. 1 (1972), U.N. Sales No. E.73 II.A.14 and corr. [hereinafter Stockholm
Declaration], reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972), and in UNITED NATIONS ENVIRON-
MENT PROGRAMME, STOCKHOLM DECLARATION, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW GUIDELINES
AND PRINCIPLES No. 1 (1972) [hereinafter UNEP GUIDELINES SERIES]; United Na-
tions Conference on the Human Environment, G.A. Res. 2994, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 30) at 42, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972); Cooperation Between States in the Area of
the Environment, G.A. Res. 299J, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 42, U.N. Doe.
A/8730 (1972); International Responsibility of States in Regard to the Environment,
G.A. Res. 2996, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 42, U.N. Doe. A/8730 (1972).
11. G.A. Res. 2997, supra note 9, at pt. I, para. 2(a)-(b).
12. Id. pt. II, para. 1.
13. Strengthening the Role and Effectiveness of the United Nations Environment
Programme, Decision 15/1 of the Governing Council of UNEP (May 25, 1989) [here,
inafter UNEP GC Decision 15/1], reprinted in UNEP GC Fifteenth Session Report,
supra note 2, at 101, pt. I, para. 1.
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developing countries.1 4 In accordance with its charter, the UNEP sec-
retariat remains relatively small in comparison to other UN bodies.10
B. STRUCTURE
The Governing Council (GC) of UNEP is composed of 58 states,
which need not be members of the UN. The GC meets biennially at
UNEP headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya to deliberate policy matters,
issue decisions, and set UNEP's agenda, including its environmental
law program.1 6 In most of its activities, UNEP plays a primarily coor-
dinative role; however, in the area of environmental law, UNEP is au-
thorized to undertake direct implementation.17
14. G.A. Res. 2997, supra note 9, pt. I, para. 2(0.
15. See id. pt. II, para. 1 (forming a small secretariat to serve as a focal point to
ensure effective management); EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED NATIONS ENVI-
RONMENT PROGRAMME, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME 149-57 (1987) (stating that UNEP's
secretariat employs nearly two hundred professionals at headquarters in Nairobi, Ke-
nya, and at sixteen duty stations around the world).
16. G.A. Res. 2997, supra note 9, part I, para. 1; Rules of Procedure of the Gov-
erning Council of the United Nations Environment Programme, Rule 1 at 6, U.N.
Doc. UNEP/GC/3/Rev.3 (Jan. 9, 1988) [hereinafter Governing Council Rules].
17. See G.A. Res. 2997, supra note 9, pt. I, para. 2(a) (stating the UNGA's dele-
gation of authority to UNEP "to promote international co-operation in the field of the
environment"); id. pt. II, para. 2(e), (j) (entrusting the Executive Director to provide,
at the request of all parties concerned, advisory services promoting international coop-
eration and to perform such other functions as the Governing Council may entrust to
him).
In delegating to UNEP the authority to promote international environmental cooper-
ation, the UNGA arguably drew on its own authority to encourage the progressivse
development of international law and promote solutions of international economic,
health and related problems. U.N. CHARTER arts. 13(l)(a), 55(b). Thus, the UNEP
Governing Council received authority to encourage the progressive development of in-
ternational environmental law and to promote solutions of international environmental
problems. Id. The GC draws on this authority when it requests the Executive Director
to develop conventions and guidelines. See, e.g., Montevideo Programme for the Devel-
opment and Periodic Review of Environmental Law, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC.lO/5/
add.2, Annex, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW UNIT, MONTEVIDEO PROGRAMME (1982) (available from UNEP) [here-
inafter MONTEVIDEO PROGRAMME] (recommending an environmental law agenda for
UNEP); Programme for the Development and Periodic Review of Environmental Law,
Decision 10/21 of the Governing Council of UNEP (May 31, 1982) [hereinafter
UNEP GC Decision 10/21], reprinted in United Nations Environment Programme:
Report of the Governing Council (Session of a special character and tenth session), 37
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 25) Annex I at 108, U.N. Doc. A/37/25 (1982) [hereinafter
UNEP GC Tenth Session Report] (adopting the Montevideo Programme). See gener-
ally UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW UNIT, EN-
VIRONMENTAL LAW IN THE UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRA ME 3 (1985)
(available from UNEP) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN UNEP] (discussing
UNEP's involvement with regional seas plans, international agreements, international
guidelines, and principles and standards).
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Two different program units share environmental law responsibilities
in UNEP. The Oceans and Coastal Areas Programme Activity Center
(OCAPAC) is responsible for the regional seas conventions.1 8 UNEP's
Environmental Law Unit handles all of UNEP's other activities in the
field of environmental law.' 9 For most UNEP convention and guideline
negotiations, the Law Unit (or OCAPAC) prepares draft documenta-
tion. UNEP then convenes an ad hoc working group of legal and tech-
nical experts to review and revise the draft.20 When a working group
has reached consensus on nonbinding guidelines, UNEP refers the
guidelines to the Governing Council for consideration and possible
adoption. If the subject matter is a binding legal instrument, UNEP
convenes a diplomatic conference to consider and hopefully adopt and
sign the instrument.
C. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PROGRAM
Recently, in accordance with the various decisions of the Governing
Council, UNEP's environmental law program has concentrated on a
broad range of global environmental problems. UNEP drafted, negoti-
ated, and obtained adoption and entry into force of the Vienna Conven-
tion for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Vienna Convention)21 and
the Montreal Protocol.22 UNEP presently serves as the secretariat for
these agreements.23
Building on the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol,
UNEP is preparing a framework convention on global climate
change.24 UNEP is undertaking this project in cooperation with other
18. See infra note 76 and accompanying text (noting Governing Council decision
establishing OCAPAC's agenda for developing regional seas conventions); infra notes
39-46 (listing regional seas agreements). Twenty-three of more than thirty environmen-
tal agreements governing major marine regions were adopted under UNEP auspices. P.
SAND, MARINE ENVIRONMENT LAW IN THE UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PRO-
GRAMME ix (1988).
19. See generally MONTEVIDEO PROGRAMME, supra note 17.
20. Working groups usually adopt the Governing Council Rules mutatis mutandis.
Supra note 16. Thus, all states are eligible to participate in the working groups, inter-
governmental and UN organizations may participate in a nonvoting capacity, and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) may participate as observers. Id.
21. See Vienna Convention, supra note 7.
22. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 7.
23. Report of the Conference of the Parties to the Vienna Convention for the Pro-
tection of the Ozone Layer, First Meeting, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Conv.1/5, at 11
(Apr. 28, 1989) [hereinafter Vienna Report].
24. See Global Climate Change, Decision 15/36 of the Governing Council of
UNEP (May 25, 1989), reprinted in UNEP GC Fifteenth Session Report, supra note
2, at 164 [hereinafter UNEP GC Decision 15/36] (requesting the Executive Director
of UNEP to begin preparations for negotiations on a framework convention on
climate).
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UN bodies, in particular, the World Meteorological Organization
(WMO).25 UNEP previously worked with WMO in developing the
Provisions for Co-operation Between States in Weather Modification."8
UNEP drafted, negotiated, and obtained adoption of the 1989 Basel
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposal27 and is currently working to obtain its en-
try into force.2 UNEP prepared a report for the UNGA on illegal
traffic in toxic and dangerous products and wastes.29 UNEP also devel-
oped a nonbinding global regime under which exporting countries are
to obtain the informed consent of importing countries prior to shipment
of any banned or severely restricted chemical or pesticide.30
UNEP serves as the secretariat to two of the principal binding legal
instruments on wildlife protection: the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)31 and
the Convention on Conservation of Migratory Species (CMS). 32 The
1982 World Charter for Nature was developed partly under UNEP
25. Id. para. 9.
26. Provisions for Co-operation Between States in Weather Modification, Decision
8/7(A) of the Governing Council of UNEP (Apr. 29, 1980) [hereinafter Provisions on
Weather Modification], reprinted in United Nations Environment Programme: Report
of the Governing Council on the Work of its eighth session, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 25) Annex I at 117, U.N. Doc. A/35/25 (1980) [hereinafter UNEP GC Eighth
Session Report]; and in WEATHER MODIFICATION, UNEP GUIDELINES SERIES No. 3,
supra note 10, at 1.
27. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposal, adopted and opened for signature Mar. 22, 1989, re-
printed in UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, BASEL CONVENTION ON THE
CONTROL OF TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENTS OF HAZARDOUS WASTES and THEIR Dis-
POSAL: FINAL ACT [hereinafter Basel Convention], and in 28 I.L.M. 649 (1989) (pro-
viding the text of Basel the Convention).
28. UNEP GC Decision 15/33, supra note 2, at para. 1.
29. Report of the Secretary-General on Illegal Traffic in Toxic and Dangerous
Products and Wastes, U.N. Doc. A/44/362 and Corr. 1 (1989). See Traffic in and
disposal, control, and transboundary movements of toxic and dangerous products and
wastes, G.A. Res. 226, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 294, U.N. Doc. A/44/49
(1989).
30. Amended London Guidelines for the Exchange of Information on Chemicals in
International Trade, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC.15/9/Add.2/Supp. 3 (1989) (available
from UNEP) [hereinafter Amended London Guidelines]; see Environmentally safe
management of chemicals, in particular those that are banned and severely restricted,
in international Trade, Decision 15/30 of the Governing Council of UNEP (May 25,
1989) [hereinafter UNEP GC Decision 15/30], reprinted in UNEP GC Fifteenth Ses-
sion Report, supra note 2, at 156 (adopting the Amended London Guidelines).
31. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora (Mar. 3, 1973) art. 12, para. 2 (entered into force July 1, 1975), 27 U.S.T. 1087,
T.I.A.S. No. 8249, reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 1085 (1973) [hereinafter CITES].
32. Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, June
23, 1979, art. 9, para. 2 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1983) [hereinafter CMS], re-
printed in 19 I.L.M. 15 (1980).
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auspices.3 3 UNEP is currently developing an umbrella convention to
address economic and other dimensions lacking in existing international
legal regimes for preservation of biological diversity.34
UNEP has developed nonbinding guidelines on the use of shared nat-
ural resources 35 and on environmental impact assessment (EIA).3 0 In
the latter field, senior advisers to the Executive Director have noted the
desirability of a global framework convention on EIA, concentrating on
transboundary effects.3 7 The UNEP Governing Council is seeking the
views of governments on the need for further development in the EIA
field. 8
UNEP has drafted, negotiated, and obtained or is in the process of
obtaining adoption of conventions and protocols protecting the Mediter-
ranean Sea,39 the Persian Gulf,40 the regional seas of the West and
33. See World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 7, 37 U.N. GAOR 8.11, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/37/7 (1982), reprinted in WORLD CHARTER FOR NATURE, UNEP GUIDE-
LINES SERIES No. 5, supra note 10, at 3.
34. Preparation of an International Legal Instrument on the Biological Diversity
of the Planet, Decision 15/34 of the Governing Council of UNEP (May 25, 1989)
[hereinafter UNEP GC Decision 15/34], reprinted in UNEP GC Fifteenth Session
Report, supra note 2, at 161.
35. Draft Principles of Conduct in the Field of the Environment for the Guidance
of States in the Conservation and Harmonious Utilization of Natural Resources
Shared by Two or More States in Report of the Fifth Session of the Intergovernmen-
tal Working Group of Experts on Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States,
U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC.6/17 (1978), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1091 (1978), and in
SHARED NATURAL RESOURCES, UNEP GUIDELINE SERIES No. 2, supra note 10 [here-
inafter Principles on Shared Natural Resources]; see Cooperation in the field of the
environment concerning natural resources shared by two or more States, decision 6/14
of the Governing Council of UNEP (May 19, 1978) (approving the principles), re-
printed in United Nations Environment Programme: Report of the Governing Council
on the Work of its sixth session, 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 25) Annex I at 154,
U.N. Doc. A/33/25 (1978) [hereinafter UNEP GC Sixth Session Report]; and see
G.A. Res. 186, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 128, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980)
(requesting all states to use the principles as guidelines in the formulation of bilateral
and multilateral conventions on shared resources).
36. Goals and Principles of Environmental Impact Assessment, U.N. Doc. UNEP/
GC.14/17, Annex III (June 1987), reprinted in ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT,
UNEP GUIDELINE SERIES No. 9, supra note 10; see Environmental Impact Assess-
ment, Decision 14/25 of the Governing Council of UNEP (June 17, 1987) (adopting
the goals and principles), reprinted in United Nations Environment Programme: Re-
port of the Governing Council on the work of its fourteenth session, 42 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 25) Annex I at 77, U.N. Doc. A/42/25 (1987) [hereinafter UNEP GC
Fourteenth Session Report].
37. UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, SENIOR ADVISERS TO THE Ex-
ECUTIVE DIRECTOR (Mar. 1988) (unpublished report available from UNEP).
38. Environment Impact Assessment, Decision 15/41 of the Governing Council of
UNEP (May 25, 1989), reprinted in UNEP GC Fifteenth Session Report, supra note
2, at 171, para. 3.
39. Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution,
done at Barcelona, Feb. 16, 1976 (entered into force Feb. 12, 1978), reprinted in 15
I.L.M. 290 (1976) [hereinafter Barcelona Convention]; Protocol for the Prevention of
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Central African region,41 the Southeast Pacific, 42 the Red Sea and Gulf
of Aden," the Caribbean Sea," the regional seas of East Africa, 5 the
Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, done at
Barcelona, Feb. 16, 1976 (entered into force Feb. 12, 1978), reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 300
(1976); Protocol Concerning Co-operation in Combating Pollution of the Mediterra-
nean Sea by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency, done at Bar-
celona, Feb. 16, 1976 (entered into force Feb. 12, 1978), reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 306
(1976); Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution from
Land-Based Sources, done at Athens, May 17, 1980 (entered into force June 17,
1983), reprinted in 19 1.L.M. 869 (1980); Protocol Concerning Mediterranean Spe-
cially Protected Areas, done at Geneva, Apr. 3, 1982 (entered into force Mar. 23,
1986), reprinted in P. SAND, supra note 18, at 37. See generally S. KUVABARA, THE
LEGAL REGIME OF THE PROTECTION OF THE MEDITERRANEAN AGAINST POLLUTION
FROM LAND-BASED SOURCES (Dublin 1984) (discussing various agreements relating to
the Mediterranean); P. SAND, supra note 18, at I (providing texts); Register of Trea-
ties, supra note 7, at 136 (providing signatory and ratification data).
UNEP prepared, and the Barcelona Convention Contracting Parties have considered,
a draft Protocol concerning the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution
Resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf and the Sea-Bed
and Its Sub-Soil.
40. Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine
Environment from Pollution, done at Kuwait, Apr. 23, 1978 (entered into force June
30, 1979), U.N., Reg. No. A - 17898, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 511 (1978); Protocol
Concerning Regional Co-operation in Combating Pollution by Oil and Other Harmful
Substances in Cases of Emergency, done at Kuwait, Apr. 24, 1978 (entered into force
July 1, 1979), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 526 (1978). See generally P. SAND, supra note
18, at 45 (providing texts).
41. Convention for Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine
and Coastal Environment of the West and Central African Region, done at Abidjan,
Mar. 23, 1981 (entered into force Aug. 5, 1984), reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 746 (1981);
Protocol Concerning Co-operation in Combating Pollution in Cases of Emergency,
done at Abidjan, Mar. 23, 1981 (entered into force Aug. 5, 1984), reprinted in 20
I.L.M. 756 (1981).
42. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Area of
the South-East Pacific, done at Lima, Nov. 12, 1981 (entered into force May 19,
1986), reprinted in UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMMF CONVENTION FOR
THE PROTECTION OF THE MARINE AND COASTAL AREA OF THE SOUTH-EAST PACIFIC
AND PROTOCOLS (1988) (available from UNEP) [hereinafter SouTH-EAST PACIFIC
CONVENTION]; Agreement on Regional Co-operation in Combating Pollution of the
South-East Pacific by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency, done
at Lima, Nov. 12, 1981 (entered into force July 14, 1986), reprinted in SoUTH-EAsT
PACIFIC CONVENTION, supra; Supplementary Protocol to the Agreement on Regional
Co-operation in Combating Pollution of the South-East Pacific by Oil and Other
Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency, done at Quito, July 22, 1983 (entered into
force May 20, 1987), reprinted in SOUTH-EAST PACIFIC CONVENTION, supra; Protocol
for the Protection of the South-East Pacific Against Pollution from Land-Based
Sources, done at Quito, July 23, 1983 (entered into force Sept. 23, 1986), reprinted in
SOTH-EAST PACIFIC CONVENTION, supra. See Generally P. SAND, supra note 18, at
84 (providing texts).
43. Regional Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden
Environment, done at Jiddah, Feb. 14, 1982 (entered into force Aug. 20, 1985), re-
printed in UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, REGIONAL CONVENTION FOR
THE CONSERVATION OF THE RED SEA AND GULF OF ADEN ENVIRONMENT (1982)
[hereinafter RED SEA CONVENTION] (available from UNEP); Protocol Concerning Re-
gional Co-operation in Combating Pollution by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in
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South Pacific, 46 and the Zambezi River Basin.417 Conventions to protect
the South Asian and East Asian regional seas are in the drafting
stage.48 UNEP has also developed nonbinding guidelines for the pre-
vention of marine pollution from land-based sources49 and from off-
shore mining and drilling. 0
Cases of Emergency, done at Jiddah, Feb. 14, 1982 (entered into force Aug. 20 1985),
reprinted in RED SEA CONVENTION, supra. See generally P. SAND, supra note 18, at
114 (providing texts).
44. Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of
the Wider Caribbean Region done at Cartagena, Mar. 24, 1983 (entered into force
Oct. 11, 1986), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 227 (1983); Protocol Concerning Co-operation
in Combating Oil Spills in the Wider Caribbean Region, done at Cartagena, Mar. 24,
1983 (entered into force Oct. 11, 1986), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 240 (1983).
45. Convention for the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine
and Coastal Environment of the Eastern African Region, done at Nairobi, June 21,
1985 (not yet in force), reprinted in UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME,
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION, MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF TIHE
MARINE AND COASTAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE EASTERN AFRICAN REGION (1985)
[hereinafter EAST AFRICAN REGION CONVENTION) (available from UNEP); Protocol
Concerning Protected Areas and Wild Fauna and Flora in the Eastern African Region,
done at Nairobi, June 21, 1985 (not yet in force), reprinted in EAST AFRICAN REGION
CONVENTION, supra; Protocol Concerning Co-operation in Combating Marine Pollu-
tion in Cases of Emergency in the Eastern African Region, done at Nairobi, June 21,
1985 (not yet in force), reprinted in EAST AFRICAN REGION CONVENTION supra.
46. Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of
the South Pacific Region, done at Noumea, Nov. 24, 1986 (not yet in force), reprinted
in 26 I.L.M, 38 (1987); Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the South Pacific
Region by Dumping, done at Noumea, Nov. 25, 1986 (not yet in force), reprinted in
26 I.L.M. 65 (1987); Protocol Concerning Co-operation in Combating Pollution Emer-
gencies in the South Pacific Region, done at Noumea, Nov. 25, 1986 (not yet in force),
reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 59 (1987).
47. Agreement on the Action Plan for the Environmentally Sound Management of
the Common Zambezi River System, done at Harare, May 28, 1987 (entered into
force May 28, 1987), reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1112 (1988).
48. Personal communication with C. DiLeva, UNEP Environmental Law Unit
(July 1989).
49. Montreal Guidelines for the Protection of the Marine Environment Against
Pollution from Land-Based Sources, reprinted in Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working
Group of Experts on the Protection of the Marine Environment Against Pollution from
Land-Based Sources, U.N. Doc. UNEP/WG.120/3 (1985), also reprinted in MARINE
POLLUTION FROM LAND-BASED SOURCES, UNEP GUIDELINES SERIES No. 7, supra
note 10, at 1. See Environmental Law: Protection of the marine environment against
pollution from land-based sources, Decision 13/18 (II) of the Governing Council of
UNEP (May 24, 1985) (encouraging states to take the guidelines into account), re-
printed in United Nations Environment Programme: Report of the Governing Council
on the work of its thirteenth session, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 25) Annex I at 53,
U.N. Doc. A/40/25 (1985) [hereinafter UNEP GC Thirteenth Session Report].
50. Conclusions of the Study of Legal Aspects Concerning the Environment Re-
lated to Offshore Mining and Drilling Within the Limits of National Jurisdiction,
reprinted in Programme Performance Report (1 Jan.-Apr. 1981), U.N. Doc. UNEP/
GC.9/5/Add. 5, Annex 111 (1981); and in OFFSHORE MINING AND DRILLING, UNEP
GUIDELINES SERIES No. 4, supra note 10 [hereinafter Legal Aspects of Offshore Min-
ing and Drilling). The conclusions were developed in accordance with the Recommen-
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UNEP has conducted research to determine priority activities in the
area of pollution damages liability', and is developing a draft liability
and compensation protocol to the Basel Convention. 2 UNEP consid-
ered developing conventions on information exchange and assistance in
the event of serious industrial accidents. For the time being, however,
the GC has decided to proceed by establishing a technical program and
an information exchange network.53
In accordance with UNEP's mandate of giving special consideration
to the situation of developing countries, 4 UNEP endeavors, within fi-
nancial and staff limitations, to provide legal assistance to such coun-
tries on request.51 UNEP publishes a number of useful reference works
in the field of international environmental law. 0 In addition, UNEP is
currently developing compendia of environmental legislation in Eastern
European countries57 and in Latin American countries. 8  UNEP's
dations of the Working Group of Governmental and Other Experts to Examine Spe-
cific Aspects of Liability for Pollution and Other Environmental Damage and
Compensation for Such Damage, U.N. Doc. UNEP/WG.54/4 (1977) [hereinafter
Recommendations on Liability]; see Programme Matters: Environmental Law, Dcci-
sion 10/14 (VI) of the Governing Council of UNEP (May 31, 1982), reprinted in
UNEP GC Tenth Session Report, supra note 17, at 101 (endorsing the conclusions);
G.A. Res. 217, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 145, 146, para. 6(b), U.N. Doc. A/
37/51 (1983) (recommending that governments should consider the conclusions when
formulating national legislation or negotiating international agreements).
51. Recommendations on Liability, supra note 50, see Environmental Law, Deci-
sion 66(IV) of the Governing Council of UNEP (Apr. 13, 1976) [hereinafter UNEP
GC Decision 66(IV)] (requesting the Executive Director to convene the working group
on liability), reprinted in United Nations Environment Programme: Report of the Gov-
erning Council on the work of its fourth session, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 25)
Annex I at 127, U.N. Doc. A/31/25 (1976) [hereinafter UNEP GC Fourth Session
Report].
52. See Resolution 3 of the Final Act of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Global Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
[hereinafter Basel Conference Final Act], reprinted in BASEL CONVENTIoN, supra note
27, at 8 (calling on the Executive Director of UNEP to establish a working group to
develop elements of a draft protocol on liability and compensation).
53. See Industrial Accidents, Decision 15/39 of the Governing Council of UNEP
(May 25, 1989), reprinted in UNEP GC Fifteenth Session Report, supra note 2, at
170.
54. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
55. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN UNEP, supra note 17, at 11 (discussing assis-
tance provided).
56. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME, SELECTED MULTILATERAL TREATIES
IN THE FIELD OF THE ENVIRONMENT (A. Kiss ed. 1982) (providing summaries, ratifica-
tion status, and full texts of treaties); Register of Treaties, supra note 7 (providing
summary information and ratification status); UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONIENT PRO-
GRAMME, DIRECTORY OF PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENTAL BODIES DEALING WITH THE EN-
VIRONMENT (Nairobi, 1989) (providing mailing, telephone, telex and telefax addresses
for national environment ministries).
57. See Kolbasov, Study of the Development of Environmental Law in the Social-
ist Countries of Eastern Europe, U.N. Doc. UNEP/IG.28, U.N. Doe. No. 8 (1981).
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Newsletter for Parliamentarians"9 highlights recent developments in
international environmental law. The UNEP Manual on Environmen-
tal Legislation60 and the UNEP publication, New Directions in Envi-
ronmental Legislation and Administration in Developing Countries,1
provide helpful guidance for legislative development.
II. UNEP'S APPROACH TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. HISTORICAL APPROACH
For the first decade of UNEP's existence, its development of environ-
mental law proceeded haphazardly, with little overall direction from
the Governing Council. The Stockholm Declaration had announced
only one principle that explicitly sought to spur development of interna-
tional law-Principle 22 on liability and compensation.62 This difficult
subject was one of the first UNEP sought to tackle.6 3
During this period the Governing Council set UNEP's law agenda
tree by tree, with little attention to the growing forest of international
environmental law. UNEP established secretariats for CITES 4 and
CMS;65 completed work on guidelines in the rather disparate areas of
shared natural resources,66 off-shore mining and drilling,61 and weather
modification; 68 commenced work on issues relating to international
trade in toxic chemicals, 9 and negotiated and obtained adoption of the
UNEP is undertaking its current work in cooperation with the Council of Mutual Eco-
nomic Assistance (CMEA) and the International Union for the Conservation of Na-
ture and Natural Resources (IUCN).
58. Research being undertaken by UNEP's Regional Office for Latin America and
the Caribbean.
59. The publication is published ten times per year, in cooperation with the Inter-
national Parliamentary Union (IPU) and IUCN (available from UNEP).
60. J. MAYDA, MANUAL ON EVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION (1979) (available from
UNEP) (providing guidance on preparing environmental legislation).
61. UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, NEW DIRECTIONS IN ENVIRON-
MENTAL LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, UNEP Doc.
No. 87-2054, mo/2521e (Nairobi, 1989) (available from UNEP).
62. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 10, Principle 22.
63. See UNEP GC Decision 66(IV), supra note 51 (regarding the convening of a
working group on liability); see also Legal Aspects of Off-Shore Mining and Drilling,
supra note 50, at pt. H (discussing liability).
64. CITES, supra note 31.
65. CMS, supra note 32.
66. Principles on Shared Natural Resources, supra note 35.
67. Legal Aspects of Off-Shore Mining and Drilling, supra note 50.
68. Provisions on Weather Modification, supra note 26.
69. See Human and environmental health, Decision 85(V) of the Governing Coun-
cil of UNEP (May 25, 1977) [hereinafter UNEP GC Decision 85(V)] (requesting the
Executive Director of UNEP to assist developing countries in strengthening their capa-
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1976 Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean
Sea Against Pollution (Barcelona Convention). 0
The Barcelona Convention provided UNEP with a significant and
successful model for the further development of international environ-
mental law.71 In 1975, UNEP invited representatives of the Mediterra-
nean Sea coastal governments to Barcelona to negotiate and adopt the
nonbinding Mediterranean Plan of Action.72 The Action Plan provided
the scientific and political basis for the negotiations leading to the
adoption of the Barcelona Convention the following year.
The Convention is a framework instrument that creates a general
obligation "to take all appropriate measures ... to prevent, abate,
and combat pollution of the Mediterranean Sea area and to protect and
enhance the marine environment in that area.173 It lists sources of pol-
lution which require control, but leaves to protocols the elaboration of
specific control measures. To date, the parties have adopted protocols
concerning dumping, oil spills and other emergencies, pollution from
land-based sources, and specially protected areas.
The Barcelona process is noteworthy in a number of ways. First, it
brought together states with widely disparate interests, some of whom
had recently been at war with each other, to adopt an agreement which
has withstood subsequent hostilities. Second, it created a framework
which required states to take on specific environmentally protective ob-
ligations, but allowed them flexibility in choosing which obligations to
undertake. 75 Third, it established a procedure which UNEP success-
bilities for evaluating chemicals, and urging governments to ensure that domestically
prohibited chemicals are not exported without the importing country's knowledge and
consent), reprinted in United Nations Environment Programme: Report of the Gov-
erning Council on the work of its fifth session, 32 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 25) Annex
I at 116, U.N. Doc. A/32/25 (1977) [hereinafter UNEP GC Fifth Session Report].
70. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing adoption of the Barce-
lona Convention).
71. See P. SAND, supra note 18, at ix (stating that most of UNEP's 23 marine
environmental agreements followed the Barcelona Model).
72. See UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, MEDITERRANEAN PLAN OF
AcTION, ADOPTED BY THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL MEETING ON THE PROTECTION OF
THE MEDITERRANEAN (Barcelona, Jan. 28-Feb. 4, 1975) (available from UNEP); see
also Barcelona Convention, supra note 39, arts. 3-4.
73. Barcelona Convention, supra note 39, art. 3.
74. See supra note 39 (listing protocols). UNEP has prepared drafts of a fifth pro-
tocol, on pollution from exploration of the continental shell and seabed. Id. Still out-
standing are the issues of liability and compensation. See Barcelona Convention, supra
note 39, art. 12 (stating that contracting parties agree to "cooperate as soon as possible
in the formulation and adoption of appropriate procedures for the determination of
liability and compensation for damages resulting from the pollution of the marine
environment").
75. See id. art. 23, para. 1 (providing that no state may become a contracting party
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fully adapted in developing an extensive body of conventions to protect
regional seas.76 Finally, it demonstrated the success of a two-step ap-
proach, using a nonbinding instrument as the prelude to a binding legal
agreement.
UNEP's environmental law activities outside the regional seas pro-
gram proceeded without specific guidance for several more years. Not
until 1982 did the UNEP Governing Council adopt the Montevideo
Programme for the Development and Periodic Review of Environmen-
tal Law (Montevideo Programme). 7 The Governing Council laid the
foundation for the Montevideo Programme in 1978, when it requested
the Executive Director of UNEP to convene a group of experts to rec-
ommend a coherent plan.78 Accordingly, the Senior Government Offi-
cials Expert in Environmental Law undertook to establish "a frame-
work, methods and programme, including global, regional, and national
efforts, for the development and periodic review of environmental
law. ' 79
The Senior Governmental Officials sought to ensure that UNEP
would undertake direct implementation in the area of environmental
law.8 The program they recommended called for development of
"guidelines, principles or agreements" in three subject areas: preven-
tion of marine pollution from land-based sources; protection of the
stratospheric ozone layer; and transport, handling and disposal of toxic
and dangerous wastes.8 ' The officials identified eight other areas for
action, namely: environmental emergencies, coastal zone management,
soil conservation, transboundary air pollution, international trade in po-
tentially harmful chemicals, protection of rivers and other inland wa-
ters against pollution, legal and administrative mechanisms for the pre-
to the Convention without also becoming a party to at least one of its protocols).
76. See The Environment Programme, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC.6/7, para. 397 (pro-
posing strategies and objectives for future conventions on the Barcelona plan); see also
UNEP GC Sixth Session Report, supra note 35, at 61, para. 252 (endorsing the pro-
posals); UNEP GC Decision 6/2 (May 24, 1978), reprinted in id. at 120 (approving
the proposals).
77. See MONTEVIDEO PROGRAMME, supra note 17, at 1-2 (establishing priorities
for the development of international environmental law).
78. See Environmental Law, Decision 8/15 of the Governing Council of UNEP
(Apr. 29, 1980) (requesting the Executive Director to convene the group), reprinted in
UNEP GC Eighth Session Report, supra note 26, at 128. See also G.A. Res. 74, 35
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 134, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1981) (welcoming the GC's
decision to convene the group).
79. MONTEVIDEO PROGRAMME, supra note 17, at 1.
80. See Montevideo Programme, supra note 17, at I.4.a. (requesting the GC "to
ensure ... [t]hat the programme for the development and periodic review of environ-
mental law is action-oriented").
81. Id. at I.2.a, II.A.1.
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vention and redress of pollution damage, and environmental impact
assessment.8 2 The Montevideo Programme set forth objectives and
strategies for each of these areas and also called upon UNEP "to pro-
mote the general development of environmental law."' ' Armed with
these directives, UNEP set off to make major strides in the develop-
ment of international environmental law.
UNEP's first notable success in implementing the Montevideo Pro-
gramme was the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer.84 The Vienna Convention became UNEP's model for subse-
quent negotiations in other fields. The Vienna process sharpened
UNEP's ability to build political, scientific and legal support for its law
activities. The Convention itself led to a protocol that provided eco-
nomic incentives for compliance and standards and methods for reas-
sessment and readjustment.8 5 The Vienna model, however, has thus far
not led UNEP to incorporate economic considerations and assessment
mechanisms into its environmental law activities on a regular basis.8
B. A PROPOSED MODEL OF UNEP's APPROACH TO THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
In the course of implementing the 1982 Montevideo Programme,
UNEP has refined its approach to tackling environmental law issues.
The organization usually begins by seeking scientific consensus on a
particular environmental problem. Then UNEP develops a strategy for
controlling the activities which give rise to the problem, and consoli-
dates political support for its control measures.
To develop a scientific position, UNEP's Executive Director, Dr.
Mostafa K. Tolba, who is a scientist, initiates in-house consultations
and solicits diverse viewpoints within and without the UN system.87 In
82. Id. at 1.2.b.
83. Id. at 1.2.c.
84. Vienna Convention, supra note 7.
85. See infra notes 117-25 and accompanying text (discussing compliance incen-
tives and reassessment provisions).
86. See infra notes 176-80 & 217-31 and accompanying text (discussing UNEP's
use of economic incentives).
87. See, e.g., Conclusions and Recommendations of the Working Group on Guide-
lines for the Control of Toxic and Other Hazardous Chemical Waste, Garmisch-
Partenkirchen (Mar. 17-20, 1981), reprinted in WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, RE-
GIONAL PUBLICATIONS EUROPEAN SERIES No. 14, MANAGEMENT OF HAZARDOUS
WASTES: POLICY GUIDELINES AND CODE OF PRACTICE 92-96 (M.J. Suess & J.W. Hu-
ismans eds. 1983) [hereinafter WASTE POLICY GUIDELINES]. This work formed the
foundation for the 1985 Cairo guidelines for hazardous waste. Cairo Guidelines and
Principles for the Environmentally Sound Management and Disposal of Hazardous
Wastes, U.N. Doe. UNEP/WG.122/3 Annex I (Dec. 1985), reprinted in ENVIRON-
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so doing, UNEP begins to identify constituencies whom it will need to
involve when consolidating its political support.
As it develops a core scientific position, UNEP also begins formulat-
ing its legal strategy. It convenes legal-technical working groups to con-
sider issues papers and drafts of legal documents which the Law Unit
prepares. Once its core legal and technical positions have coalesced,
UNEP begins consolidating its political support. It identifies key con-
stituencies such as developing countries, newly industrialized countries,
industry associations, and environmental nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs). UNEP solicits their views through formal meetings and
informal consultations. The UNEP Secretariat participates actively in
these sessions,8 8 particularly through its Executive Director, a brilliant
negotiator with great dedication, drive, and political acumen.
Working on the Barcelona model,8" UNEP usually begins with the
development of nonbinding guidelines or principles.90 When these have
been adopted, the GC may seek a binding legal agreement; however, it
does not do so in all cases.91
The control measures UNEP selects consist primarily of targets for
reducing pollutant emissions (e.g., of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)), and
notice and consent controls on trade (e.g., in waste, chemicals, or en-
dangered species). The effectiveness of control measures, however,
often depends on precisely that which is lacking at the international
level: an effective enforcement entity. Moreover, economic incentives
which might boost compliance are not regular components of UNEP's
approach. UNEP does not usually evaluate ex ante the economic impli-
MENTALLY SOUND MANAGEMENT OF HAZARDOUS WASTES, UNEP GUIDELINES SERIES
No. 8, supra note 10 [hereinafter Cairo Guidelines]; see Environmentally Sound Man-
agement of Hazardous Wastes, decision 14/30 of the Governing Council of UNEP
(June 17, 1987) [hereinafter UNEP GC Decision 14/30] (adopting the Cairo Guide-
lines), reprinted in UNEP GC Fourteenth Session Report, supra note 36, at 83. The
Cairo Guidelines in turn formed the basis for the Basel Convention, supra note 27.
88. Working with science staff from five different UNEP technical units, from Sep-
tember 1988 to May 1989 the Law Unit staffed twenty-three negotiating sessions, in-
cluding four diplomatic conferences at the ministerial level, changing venues fourteen
different times, The Law Unit organizes the meetings and coordinates correspondence,
translation, documentation, interpretation, security, credentials, press, budgets, travel,
and financial support to defray expenses for participants from developing countries.
This heavy administrative workload restricts the time, critical in environmental law
practice, for Law Unit consultation with colleagues in the technical units.
89. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text (discussing the Barcelona
approach).
90. See supra notes 30, 35, 36, 49, & 50 and accompanying text (identifying exam-
ples of nonbinding instruments developed by UNEP). But see infra notes 98-106 and
accompanying text (noting direct development of the ozone layer convention).
91. See, e.g., supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (noting that although the
GC has adopted EIA guidelines, it has not moved toward developing a convention).
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cations of the legal regimes it proposes. It also does not usually con-
sider how to build into those regimes mechanisms for assessing their
efficacy.
The notable exception, as discussed below, is in the field of ozone
layer protection, where UNEP's approach has yielded economically
sensible and measurable controls. In the area of hazardous wastes, by
contrast, the absence of an economic perspective may undermine
UNEP's Basel Convention, while lack of fofmal measurement parame-
ters may complicate evaluation of the Convention's effectiveness if and
when it enters into force.
UNEP has recently begun to give more consideration to economic
aspects of legal regimes. 2 As discussed below, such input will be criti-
cal to the success of UNEP's future legal efforts, particularly in the
areas of chemicals trade, preservation of biological diversity, and global
climate change.
C. CASE STUDIES
1. Protection of the Ozone Layer
a. History
UNEP's most significant environmental law successes have been the
Vienna Convention93 and Montreal Protocol . 4 In 1974, scientists Sher-
wood Rowland and Mario Molina of the University of California dis-
covered that certain CFCs, commonly used in airconditioning, aerosols,
foam insulation and cleaning solvents, could rise to the stratospheref 5
There the chemicals, in reactions catalyzed by sunlight, caused a rapid
breakdown of the stratospheric ozone (0) into molecular oxygen (02).1
This was a finding of health and environmental significance. The frag-
ile stratospheric ozone layer absorbs highly damaging ultraviolet radia-
tion from the sun, and thus makes life on earth possible. 7
Reacting to this information, in the late 1970s several countries, in-
cluding the United States, banned CFC aerosols. Global CFC con-
92. See, e.g., UNEP GC Decision 15/34, supra note 34 (directing UNEP to con-
sider the economic dimension in its development of an umbrella convention on preser-
vation of biological diversity); Vienna Convention, supra note 7, Annex II (directing
parties to exchange technical, socio-economic, and business information).
93. Vienna Convention, supra note 7.
94. Montreal Protocol, supra note 7.
95. See Begley, A Gaping Hole in the Sky, NEVSWEEK, July 11, 1988, at 21(citing the work of Rowland and Molina).
96. Id.
97. Id.
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sumption continued to climb, however, as the chemicals were put to
other uses. In 1980 the Governing Council directed UNEP to under-
take measures to protect the ozone layer from modifications due to
human activities, 98 and in 1981 the GC called for a convention.0 9
The Montevideo Programme gave high priority to the development
of a convention on ozone layer protection.100 Building on its Barcelona
Convention model, 101 UNEP sought to obtain simultaneous adoption of
a framework convention and a protocol controlling CFCs. There was no
scientific consensus, however, on the extent of CFC-catalyzed ozone
layer depletion. Several CFC-producing countries, most notably Ja-
102pan, questioned the need for a CFC protocol. By 1985 UNEP had
achieved consensus on only the framework convention.10 3
Almost immediately after the convention was adopted, UNEP re-
sumed intensive negotiations on the protocol. British reports of a hole
in the ozone layer over Antarctica spurred the momentum.0 4 Scientific
evidence also began to implicate substances other than CFCs. In mid-
1987 the Governing Council recommended that the protocol negotia-
tions consider the full range of ozone-depleting substances. 10 Barely
three months later, a UNEP-convened diplomatic conference adopted
the Montreal Protocol.'0
98. Decision 8/7(B) of the Governing Council of UNEP (Apr. 29, 1980), re-
printed in UNEP GC Eighth Session Report, supra note 26, at 118.
99. Decision 9/13(B) of the Governing Council of UNEP (May 26, 1981), re-
printed in United Nations Environment Programme: Report of the Governing Council
on the work of its ninth session, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 25) at 118, U.N. Doe. A/
36/25 (1981) [hereinafter UNEP GC Ninth Session Report].
100. See MONTEVIDEO PROGRAMME, supra note 17, at II.A.l.b. (directing UNEP
to develop a convention to limit, reduce, and prevent activities that may have adverse
effects on stratospheric ozone).
101. See Barcelona Convention, supra note 39 (adopting convention and protocols
together).
102. See Declaration of Japan made at the time of the adoption of the Final Act of
the Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, submit-
ted March 22, 1985, reprinted in Vienna Convention, supra note 7, at 35 (contending
that each country should decide how to control CFC emissions).
103. Vienna Convention, supra note 7. To date, 43 countries and the European
Community (EC) have ratified the Vienna Convention. Vienna Report, supra note 23,
at 1.
104. See Begley, supra note 95, at 21-22 (reporting on the discovery of a hole in
the ozone layer over Antarctica).
105. Decision 14/28 of the Governing Council of UNEP (June 17, 1987), reprinted
in UNEP GC Fourteenth Session Report, supra note 36, at 81.
106. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 7; see generally Doolittle, Underestimating
Ozone Depletion: The Meandering Road to the Montreal Protocol and Beyond, 16
ECOLOGY L.Q. 407 (1989) (providing historical discussion and critique of the Montreal
Protocol). Forty-one countries have ratified the protocol. UNITED NATIONS ENVIRON-
MENT PROGRAMME, MONTREAL PROGRAMME ON SUBSTANCES THAT DEPLETE THE
OZONE LAYER: ECONOMIC PANEL REPORT 9 (July 1989) [hereinafter ECONOMIC
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b. Legal Strategy
UNEP's strategy in ozone layer protection was to go for a convention
directly without getting bogged down in soft law preliminaries.107 This
strategy was aided by the emergence, over the six years of negotiations,
of a set of governmental negotiators-scientists and legal/political ex-
perts from developing and developed countries-who understood the
importance of the issue and were committed to reaching consensus.
UNEP took care to involve not only environmental NGOs, but also
industry groups. UNEP recognized that without industry support, CFC
production controls would be meaningless. Fortunately for UNEP's ef-
forts, CFC production is concentrated among relatively few countries
and companies.108 The major producers and some of the major consum-
ers are large, publicly held firms and are thus increasingly sensitive to
public pressure of the environmental kind."0 '
The constituency that presented the greatest challenge to UNEP's
drive for consensus was comprised of Asian and Pacific countries.
Many of these had recently joined the ranks of CFC-producing coun-
tries and were seeking greater shares of the global market. Japan, a
recalcitrant in the Vienna Convention days,110 finally joined the Proto-
col. Thailand and Singapore recently became parties, while India and
the Republic of Korea have yet to ratify the agreement." 1
c. Results
Potentially, the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol constitute
a highly effective regime for reducing-and possibly, in the future,
PANEL REPORT].
107. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
108. See ECONOMIC PANEL REPORT, supra note 106, at 130 (listing ten European
and American companies which, together with Australian companies, represent "a
large portion" of world CFC production).
109. See Begley, supra note 95, at 23 (noting that du Pont plans to phase out CFC
production by 2000); see also ECONOMIC PANEL REPORT, supra note 105, at 120 (not-
ing that eight major producers have announced policies to phase out CFC production
as soon as safe alternatives become available, while du Pont has made the further com-
mitment not to sell Halon 1301 for discharge testing after 1998); id. at 122 (noting
that American Foodservice and Packaging Institute and three environmental public in-
terest organizations have negotiated voluntary programs to phase out CFC-I 1 and
CFC-12 from food packaging materials).
110. Supra note 102 and accompanying text.
111. See Report of the First Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5 at 2, para.
4 (May 6, 1989) [hereinafter Montreal Report] (listing the 31 countries party to the
Montreal Protocol); cf. ECONOMIC PANEL REPORT, supra note 106, at 9 (noting that
outside of North America and Europe, few countries have ratified the Montreal
Protocol).
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eliminating-emissions of ozone layer-depleting chemicals. Unlike most
other environmental agreements, the Montreal Protocol also contains
economic incentives to encourage participation and compliance. It fur-
ther provides for assessment of its efficacy and for readjustment.
The Vienna Convention is the central international mechanism for
harmonizing national and international policies and strategies on ozone
layer research. 112 The Montreal Protocol is the central international
control instrument. It freezes CFC consumption as of January 1,
1990;113 requires 50% reductions in CFC production and consumption
by mid-1998;114 and mandates a 1992 freeze on the consumption of
halons.1 5 The parties have agreed to establish a working group to de-
velop recommendations concerning the determination and consequences
of noncompliance." 6
The Montreal Protocol uses three kinds of provisions as economic
incentives to encourage participation in and compliance with the Proto-
col's control regime: (1) entry into force requirements, (2) controls on
trade with nonparties, and (3) research and technology transfer bene-
fits. While the Protocol could have used other types of economic incen-
tives, 7 each of these kinds of provisions aims to make continued pro-
duction of ozone-destroying CFCs less profitable, while boosting the
market for safer substitutes.
Article 16 of the Montreal Protocol provides that eleven countries
representing two-thirds of global consumption of controlled substances
must ratify the Protocol before it may enter into force. 118 Thus, the
Protocol creates a cartel of consumers who control the consumption
market, and who have agreed to reduce their consumption. Since most
of the major consuming countries are also major producers, the con-
sumption cartel also operates as a production cartel which has effec-
112. Vienna Report, supra note 23, at 9.
113. Montreal Protocol, supra note 7, art. 2. Consumption is defined as production
plus imports minus exports. Id. art 1, para. 6. The controlled substances are listed in an
annex. Id. Annex A.
114. Id. art. 2.
115. Id. Halons are chemically related to CFCs and are used principally in fire-
fighting. ECONOMIC PANEL REPORT, supra note 106, at 19.
116. Montreal Report, supra note I11, at 14-15.
117. Cf. NORDISK MINISTERRAD, ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR REDUCING CFC
EMISSIONS (Copenhagen, 1988) (available from the Nordic Council of Ministers, Store
Strandstraede 18, 1255 Copenhagen, Denmark) (describing various types of economic
incentives); see also ECONOMIC PANEL REPORT, supra note 106, at 74 (discussing fee
schemes).
118. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 7, art. 16 (specifying requirements for en-
try into force). The current parties to the Protocol together account for about 80% of
global consumption. ECONOMIC PANEL REPORT, supra note 106, at 9.
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tively agreed to scale back production. 119 Furthermore, as a result of
the consumption cutback, this production cartel will face a shrinking
market, with correspondingly lower prices and profits, discouraging
continued production.
Article 4 of the Montreal Protocol gradually prohibits trade in con-
trolled substances with nonparties. 2 ° Consequently, nonparty produc-
ing states will also face declining demand, with similar effects on
prices, profits and production.
As a further result of Article 4's ban on trade with nonparties, non-
party consuming states will face a diminishing legal supply of con-
trolled substances. This could give rise to black markets, were it not for
the fact that the Vienna Convention specifically encourages research on
the development of substitutes.1 2 The Montreal Protocol's consumption
controls should accelerate these processes.1 22 Nonparty consumer states
should therefore find increased availability of safe substitutes, which
they can obtain legally from states party to the Protocol. The prices for
these substitutes should become competitive as producers in party
states shift to producing substitutes instead of producing controlled
substances.
The Protocol promotes technology transfer to parties who are devel-
oping countries, thereby offering economic incentives for developing
countries to join and comply. 23 The benefits of technology transfer
should improve the ability of newly industrialized producing countries
to penetrate the growing substitutes market. In addition, countries that
are located in tropical climates, where demand for coolants is presuma-
119. See supra note 113 (noting that the Protocol defines consumption as produc-
tion plus imports minus exports).
120. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 7, art. 4 (stating that within one year each
party shall ban the import of controlled substances from any state not party to the
Protocol). Currently, nonparties account for 20% of global consumption, mainly in
newly industrialized and other developing countries. ECONOMIC PANEL REPORT, supra
note 106, at 9. Concentration in the production industry should help prevent nonparties
from starting up new production of controlled substances. Id. at 130 (noting that vari-
ous countries and corporations representing a large portion of world CFC production
have agreed not to sell or license CFC or halon manufacturing technology to
nonparties).
121. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 3, para. 1(0.
122. See EcONOMIC PANEL REPORT, supra note 106, at 122 (noting that phase-out
policies create solid markets as customers seek new products and services that reduce
and eliminate CFC and halon use); id. at 125-28 (stating that producer and consumer
associations are cooperating in development of alternatives).
123. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 7, arts. 8, 10 (discussing technical assis-
tance to developing countries); see also id. art. 5 (requiring parties to cooperate in
promoting research, development, and information exchange). Developing countries are
further given a "break" on implementing control measures, to allow additional time for
technology transfers to take place. Id. art. 5.
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bly high, should be interested in developing local production of substi-
tutes in order to reduce dependence on expensive imports. The rewards
of obtaining technology to develop local production, coupled with the
difficulties of obtaining products from other nonparties, should en-
courage developing countries to join the protocol.
The Montreal Protocol specifically provides for readjustment of its
controls. 24 The parties can undertake such readjustment on the basis
of new information about the state of the ozone layer. In light of the
preliminary reports of scientific, technical, economic, and environmen-
tal assessment panels convened under the Protocol, UNEP has already
recommended that the parties amend the Protocol to phase out all pro-
tocol-controlled CFCs by 2005.125
The parties to the Protocol could also re-evaluate the control mea-
sures based on the degree of compliance achieved. Compliance could be
measured in terms of reductions in CFC emissions over time, compared
against 1986 consumption. 26 In the short term, the relatively concen-
trated nature of the CFC industry, its susceptibility to the current cli-
mate of pro-environment political pressures, and the sense of personal
commitment that many negotiators developed over the past ten years,
increase the likelihood that compliance will continue with measurable
results. Over time, however, if the Montreal Protocol increases compe-
tition in the substitutes ifidustry, production may shift to smaller com-
panies 117 less susceptible to these compliance pressures. Hopefully, the
Protocol's economic incentives, as well as increased global awareness of
the ozone layer problem, will continue to foster compliance with these
much-needed control measures.
124. Id. art. 2, para. 9; see id. art. 6 (requiring panels to be convened on a regular
basis to review scientific, environmental, technical, and economic information).
125. See Note by the Executive Director of UNEP to the Open-Ended Working
Group of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol to Integrate the Four Reports of the
Assessment Panels into One Synthesis Report and to Make Recommendations on
Amendments to the Montreal Protocol, U.N. Doc. UNEP/Oz.Pro.Asmt/l/2, at 7
(July 17, 1989) (noting that a phase down of protocol-controlled CFC's by 95-98% by
2000 and complete phaseout by 2005 appears technically feasible); Helsinki Declara-
tion on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, reprinted in Montreal Report, supra note
111, app. I, and in 28 I.L.M. 1335 (1989) (declaring countries' intent to phase out
production and consumption of CFCs and other currently known and potential ozone-
depleting substances).
126. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 7, art. 2, paras. 1-6 (establishing 1986 as
the base year for calculating consumption levels); cf. Commoner, supra note 5 (mea-
suring efficacy of environmental controls in terms of emissions of controlled
substances).
127. See Begley, supra note 95, at 23 (noting a small biotechnology company's
development of a solvent to replace CFCs used to clean electronics equipment).
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2. Environmentally Sound Management of Hazardous Wastes
a. History
The only global instrument controlling the transfrontier, nonoceanic
dumping of hazardous wastes is the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal
(Basel Convention). 2 " The Convention was adopted in 1989, but the
UNEP's Governing Council had identified the control of hazardous
wastes as a concern almost ten years earlier,20 and had convened a
working group to develop technical guidelines on hazardous waste
management. 30
The 1982 Montevideo Programme directed UNEP to develop legal
guidelines on hazardous waste management. 13 ' Accordingly, UNEP
convened a working group of legal and technical experts which negoti-
ated the 1985 Cairo Guidelines and Principles for the Environmentally
Sound Management and Disposal of Hazardous Wastes.3 2
When the Cairo Guidelines came before the UNEP Governing
Council in 1987, events 33 had focused the Council's attention on the
narrow but high-profile question of international waste traffic. The
Governing Council adopted the Cairo Guidelines and requested the
UNEP Executive Director to convene a working group to prepare a
global convention on control of transboundary movements of hazardous
waste by early 1989.1"
Negotiations commenced almost immediately. While some of the
delegates had participated in prior waste negotiations and were famil-
128. BASEL CONVENTION, supra note 27. At least two global conventions govern
the disposal of hazardous waste at sea. See International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution from Ships, 1973, I.M.C.O. Doc. MP/CONF/WP.21/Add. 4 (1973), re-
printed in 12 I.L.M. 1319 (1973), as modified by Protocol of 1978 Relating to the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, opened for
signature June 1, 1978 (entered into force Oct. 2, 1983), I.M.C.O. Doc. TSPP/
CONF/1 1 (1978), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 546 (1978) (regulating the discharge of oil,
noxious liquids and garbage from ships); International Convention on the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, done at London, Dec. 29,
1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120 (entered into force Aug.
30, 1975) (controlling ocean dumping of wastes other than those incidental to the nor-
mal operation of ships).
129. Decision 8/8 of the Governing Council of UNEP (Apr. 29, 1980), reprinted in
UNEP GC Eighth Session Report, supra note 26, at 119.
130. Id.; see supra note 87 (noting the WASTE PoLicY GUIDELINES).
131. MONTEVIDEO PROGRAMME, supra note 17, at 4.
132. Cairo Guidelines, supra note 87.
133. See, e.g., Langone, Waste: A Stinking Mess, TIME, Jan. 2, 1989, at 44 (noting
the voyage of the waste-carrying freighter Pelicano, which set sail in 1986 and
wandered for more than two years in search of a dumpsite).
134. UNEP GC Decision 14/30, supra note 87.
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iar with the issues, new players with new views and priorities soon be-
gan streaming in. They included previously uninvolved countries, inter-
national organizations, environmental groups, and trade associations
for the manufacturing, inspection, transport, treatment and recycling
industries. After eighteen months of nearly continuous negotiations, a
diplomatic conference adopted the Basel Convention on March 2,
1989.135
b. Legal Strategy
UNEP's approach to developing the Basel convention was of neces-
sity more ramified than its ozone strategy. It has been said 136 that legal
problems come in two types: artichokes and pretzels. To solve an ar-
tichoke problem, pluck out a few leaves, and the heart of the problem
appears. Pretzel problems, however, twist and curl, leading from one
issue to the next. If protection of the ozone layer was an artichoke
problem, with controls on CFC consumption being the heart, hazardous
waste was a pretzel by comparison. A swarm of legal, technical, and
political issues, all to be dealt with in the abbreviated timetable which
the GC had set for adopting the convention, increased the pressure on
UNEP.
The 1981 technical guidelines'37 and 1985 Cairo Guidelines' 8 pro-
vided UNEP with scientific and legal bases for its waste convention
negotiating strategy. After the first few meetings, however, it became
apparent that the major stumbling blocks would be political and
economic.
The principal disputes were as follows. First, some countries and en-
vironmental groups called for a complete ban on all international waste
shipments. 39 Arguably, a ban would force waste reduction at the
source. 4 1 Other countries and organizations stated that the convention
135. BASEL CONVENTION, supra note 27. Thirty-five countries and the EC have
signed the convention; of those, thirty-four signed immediately upon adoption. Green-
house, UN Conference Supports Curbs on Exporting of Hazardous Waste, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 23, 1989, at 1.
136. Lecture by Professor Lance Liebman, Harvard Law School, Dec. 1981.
137. WASTE POLICY GUIDELINES, supra note 87.
138. Cairo Guidelines, supra note 87.
139. See, e.g., Report of the Second Session of the Ad Hoc Working Group of
Legal and Technical Experts with a Mandate to Prepare a Global Convention on the
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes, U.N. Doc. UNEP/
WG.186/3, at 5, para. 3 (June 20, 1988) [hereinafter Caracas Report] (noting the
statement of a Jamaican expert urging prohibition of waste shipments); id. at 9, para.
35 (noting that Greenpeace International supported a world-wide ban on all exports of
hazardous waste); cf. Langone, supra note 133, at 47 (urging a global ban).
140. Cf. Cairo Guidelines, supra note 87 (stating that the first priority in hazard-
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should not annul existing and pending bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments on waste transport, recycling, and disposal.14 1 They pointed out
that existing legal agreements governing intra-European and North
American waste trade actually sanctioned most international hazardous
waste shipments. 42 Because much of this traffic has economic signifi-
cance, 143 many countries opposed a flat ban.
Even if a ban on waste exports were rejected in favor of an interna-
tional permit system, the problem of traffic in violation of that system
remained. Fearing they would bear the brunt of such dumping,144 de-
veloping countries, especially African nations, pressed the question of
illegal traffic.145 Arguing that a convention which did not deal with dis-
ous waste management is to reduce waste generation at the source).
141. See, e.g., Report of the Fourth Session of the Ad Hoc Working Group of
Legal and Technical Experts with a Mandate to Prepare a Global Convention on the
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes, U.N. Doc. UNEP/
WG.190/4, at 9-10, para. 47 (Feb. 13, 1989) [hereinafter Luxembourg Report] (not-
ing the work of the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) on a draft convention for
civil liability for damage caused during carriage of dangerous goods); id. (noting the
work of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Legal Committee on a con-
vention on liability and compensation with respect to carriage of hazardous substances
at sea); see id. (noting the work of the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) on a draft convention on transport terminal operator liability).
142. See, e.g., Luxembourg Report, supra note 141, at 5, para. 17 (noting the exis-
tence of an EEC directive on transboundary waste disposal in the European Commu-
nity). Eighty percent of the 2.5 million metric tons of toxic waste exported from Eu-
rope each year is shipped to other Western European countries, with 15% shipped to
Eastern Europe, and only 5% to developing countries. Greenhouse, supra note 135, at
B1 1. Cf. Agreement between the United States of America and the United Mexican
States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the
Border Area, done at La Paz, Baja California (Aug. 14, 1983), T.I.A.S. No. 10827,
reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 1025 (1983), Annex III: Agreement of Cooperation Between the
United States of America and the United Mexican States Regarding the Trans-
boundary Shipments of Hazardous Wastes and Hazardous Substances, done at Wash-
ington, D.C., Nov. 12, 1986 (entered into force Jan. 29, 1987), reprinted in 26 I.L.M.
15 (1987) (providing for hazardous waste imports only with consent of the importing
country).
143. For example, some Western European countries import wastes as raw materi-
als for metals recovery. Cf. Declaration of Senegal, C6te d'lvoire, Belgium et al. made
at the time of the adoption of the Basel Conference Final Act, submitted Mar. 22,
1989, reprinted in, BASEL CONVENTION, supra note 27, at 24-25 (stating that
"Belgium considers that this declaration [by which signatories, inter alia, "confirm
their strong intention to dispose of wastes in the country of origin"] does not preclude
the import into its territory of wastes defined as primary/secondary raw materials").
144. See Langone, supra note 133, at 47 (quoting a Nigerian diplomat that
"[i]nternational dumping is the equivalent of declaring war on people of a country").
145. See Caracas Report, supra note 139, at 8-9, para. 34(e) (noting the concern
of the Group of 77 on the need to prevent clandestine and illegal transboundary move-
ments of hazardous wastes); Resolution on Dumping of Nuclear and Industrial Wastes
in Africa, Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), CM/Res.
1153 (XLVIII) (May 1988), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 567 (1989) (declaring that the
dumping of industrial wastes in Africa is a crime against Africa and the African peo-
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posal would be environmentally insufficient, developing countries urged
that exporting states be held responsible not only for transboundary
movement, but also for disposal in cases of illegal traffic.146 These
countries sought state of export liability even where illegal traffic had
occurred because of an importer or disposer's fraudulent activity.147
This was, in effect, a warning that at least some importing states
viewed importer corruption as beyond state control.
Developed countries opposed the disposal obligation, as it implicated
doctrines of state responsibility. 48 The developed countries were espe-
cially reluctant to undertake such obligations given developing coun-
tries' stated position on corruption. 9 Moreover, rumors were circulat-
ing that some African governments had been quietly negotiating
lucrative waste import deals. 150
A few developed countries arguably stood to benefit if exporting
states were held responsible for disposal. In that situation, exporting
states might require their exporters to obtain preshipment and/or pre-
disposal verification of shipment contents, to reduce the likelihood of
illegal substitution of more toxic waste.' 5' This could mean a windfall
for preshipment inspection firms, most of whom are located in devel-
oped, Western European countries. 52
Perhaps the most politically charged issue was the conflict over the
ple, and requesting the OAU Secretary-General to raise the matter in the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly).
146. See Caracas Report, supra note 139, at 9, para. 34(c) (noting Group of 77's
position that transboundary movement must engage the responsibility of the state of
export); Declaration of Ghana made at the time of the adoption of the Basel Confer-
ence Final Act, submitted Mar. 22, 1989, reprinted in BASEL CONVENTION, supra note
27, at 18 [hereinafter Declaration of Ghana] (declaring that the responsibility for dis-
posal in cases of illegal traffic should lie with the state of export, or the exporter or
generator).
147. See Declaration of Ghana, supra note 146, at 18 (declaring that the state of
export or the exporter or generator should be held responsible for illegal traffic result-
ing from the conduct of the importer or disposer).
148. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 207, 711 (1987) (explaining the United States foreign relations law perspec-
tive on state responsibility).
149. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing the Declaration of
Ghana).
150. See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 135, at 1 (reporting on "[sicandals involving
unscrupulous European waste-disposal companies that have bribed African officials to
gain permission to dump waste at unsafe sites").
151. See Caracas Report, supra note 139, at 31 (proposing that a list of preship-
ment inspection firms be annexed to the convention). Such firms would be retained at
the exporter's expense. Id.
152. See, e.g., 3 WARD'S BUSINESS DIRECTORY A-341, B-171, & C-156, (1985)(providing business data on one of the largest preshipment inspection firms, Societ
Gn~ral de Surveillance of Switzerland).
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right, championed by Portugal and many developing countries, 5 3 of a
transit country to control hazardous waste traffic in its territorial sea
and exclusive economic zone.154 The United States, Japan, and
others' 55 argued that this right should not impede the navigational
rights of ships.156 This was a dispute of long standing and one which is
likely to recur in future environmental negotiations. 157
To engineer consensus on these tangled issues in the short time
frame which the GC had set, UNEP exhorted each of the disparate
interest groups to raise its concerns and consolidate its position as soon
as possible. The Executive Director held numerous formal and informal
consultations with representatives from each constituency and pro-
pounded myriad notes to the working group identifying issues and pro-
posing solutions.'58 The constant influx of new participants, however,
complicated this process.' 59 Each shaky consensus seemed to fall apart
at the next meeting.
153. See, e.g., Declaration of Portugal, reprinted in BASEL CONVENION, supra
note 27, at 31; Declaration of Colombia, id. at 26; Declaration of Mexico, id. at 30;
Declaration of Uruguay, id. at 32; Declaration of Venezuela, id. at 34; Caracas Re-
port, supra note 139, at 8-9 (documenting statements of experts from the Group of 77
advocating greater transit state control over shipments of hazardous waste).
154. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature
Dec. 10, 1982 (not yet in force), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21
I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS], arts. 2, 3, & 21-25 (defining rights of
coastal states over territorial sea); id. arts. 55-58 & 73 (defining rights of coastal states
over the 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ)).
155. See, e.g., Declaration of Japan made at the time of the adoption of the Basel
Conference Final Act, submitted Mar. 22, 1989, reprinted in Basel Convention, supra
note 27, at 19; Declaration of the German Democratic Republic, id. at 35.
156. See UNCLOS, supra note 154, arts. 17-19 (defining right of innocent passage
in territorial sea); id. arts. 58 & 87 (defining navigational rights in EEZ).
157. The conflict underscores the need to develop new conceptual frameworks for
reconciling the competing concerns of political, economic, and environmental security.
Cf. Mathews, supra note 1, at 162 (proposing an expansion of the definition of national
security).
158. See, e.g., Note by the Executive Director to the Second Session of the Ad
Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts with the Mandate to Prepare a
Global Convention on the Control of the Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Waste, U.N. Doc. UNEP/WG.186/2 (June 1988) (addressing the issue of defining
hazardous waste and the limited capability of developing countries to assess the haz-
ardous nature of wastes); Note by the Executive Director on Some Points of the Haz-
ardous Wastes Convention Which Were not Resolved at the Fourth Session of the Ad
Hoc Working Group, U.N. Doc. UNEP/WG.191/2 (Feb. 10, 1989).
159. At each session new participants from governments, industry, and NGOs
sought to open up previously agreed provisions and to make new proposals. Delegates
who had participated at previous meetings were displeased at seeing their hard-won
gains dismantled, while new participants felt frustrated, as if the old guard were trying
to exclude them from the process.
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c. Results
The Basel Convention, as finally adopted, covers not only hazardous
wastes, but also municipal wastes, including ash from municipal incin-
erators.160 It regulates not only transboundary movement, but also
disposal.''
The Convention establishes a waste export notice and consent system
to control transboundary traffic. An exporting state shall not permit a
waste export to occur until it has notified the importing state, received
written confirmation of the importing state's consent, and received the
importing state's confirmation of the existence of a contract specifying
environmentally sound management of the waste."6 2 Transit countries
which are parties to the Convention shall be notified of proposed ship-
ments.16 3 In exercise of its sovereign rights over the area under its na-
tional jurisdiction, a transit state may control passage of ships carrying
waste, as long as its actions do not affect the exercise of navigational
rights under international law, and vice versa.6
Parties shall not allow waste exports to countries which have legisla-
tion prohibiting imports, or where there is reason to believe waste will
not be managed in an environmentally sound manner according to cri-
teria to be decided at some future date. 665 Waste trade with nonparties
160. Compare UNEP GC Decision 14/30, supra note 87 (calling for a convention
on control of transboundary movements of hazardous wastes) with the BASEL CONVEN-
TION, supra note 27, arts. 1, 2, 4 & 9 and Annex II (covering not only hazardous, but
also municipal wastes).
161. See BASEL CONVENTION, supra note 27, art. 1, paras. 2 & 4 (defining man-
agement as including "disposal"); id. art. 4, para. 2(b) (obligating parties to ensure the
availability of adequate and environmentally sound disposal facilities).
162. BASEL CONVENTION, supra note 27, art. 6, annexes I-111; see also, Hackett,
An Assessment of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 5 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 291 (1990)
(providing a detailed discussion of the Basel Convention).
163. BASEL CONVENTION, supra note 27, art. 4, para. 2e.
164. Id. art. 4, para. 12. The Convention states:
Nothing in this Convention shall affect in any way the sovereignty of States
over their territorial sea established in accordance with international law, and the
sovereign rights and the jurisdiction which States have in their exclusive eco-
nomic zones and their continental shelves in accordance with international law,
and the exercise by ships and aircraft of all States of navigational rights and
freedoms as provided for in international law and as reflected in relevant interna-
tional instruments.
Id.
The Basel Conference also adopted a resolution calling UNEP and the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) to review the situation regarding transport of wastes by
sea and recommend "any additional measures needed . . . to assist coastal States, flag
States, and port States in fulfilling their responsibilities with respect to the protection
of the marine environment." Id. resolution 7, at 13.
165. Id. art. 4, para. 2e.
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is prohibited,166 as are exports to Antarctica.6 7 Shipments may occur
under other bilateral, multilateral, or regional agreements, provided
that those agreements stipulate provisions no less environmentally
sound than the Basel Convention."6 8
The Convention provides an extensive set of definitions of illegal traf-
fic, including transboundary movement of wastes with consent obtained
"through falsification, misrepresentation or fraud." 6 , The exporting
state must take the waste back if the illegal traffic results from the
exporter's or generator's conduct.170 If the illegal traffic results from
conduct of the importer or disposer, the importing state shall ensure
environmentally sound disposal.17 If responsibility cannot be assigned,
the parties shall co-operate to ensure environmentally sound disposal.17 2
Any party which believes another party is in breach of the Convention
may inform the secretariat, 73 which shall circulate to the parties con-
cerned any information it has regarding illegal traffic. 7 4 UNEP pres-
ently serves as the interim secretariat.170
UNEP surmounted many political obstacles in obtaining adoption of
the Basel Convention. The convention, however, lacks economic incen-
tives to encourage compliance, spur waste reduction, or combat the ru-
mored corruption on both sides of north-south trade. In considering
what economic incentives UNEP could have included in the Basel Con-
vention, it is useful to compare the economic underpinnings of the
Montreal Protocol.176
First, the Montreal Protocol controls consumption of a valuable good
(CFCs). Wastes, by contrast, often have negative value; that is why
generators pay to get rid of them. Absent civil or criminal liability
schemes, generators and others have an economic incentive to 'lose'
wastes during transport in order to avoid disposal costs. It is this incen-
tive to lose wastes that makes the waste trade particularly susceptible
to corruption.
Second, UNEP was able to create a producer 'cartel' under the
Montreal Protocol in part because CFC production is concentrated
166. Id. para. 5.
167. Id. para. 6.
168. Id. art. 11.
169. Id. art. 9, para. l(c).
170. Id. para. 2.
171. Id. para. 3.
172. Id. para. 4.
173. Id. art. 19.
174. Id. art. 16, para. 1(h).
175. Id. para. 2.
176. See supra notes 107-27 and accompanying text (discussing the Montreal
Protocol).
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among a few large companies. Hazardous and municipal waste genera-
tors, by contrast, are vastly more numerous and diverse, ranging from
households to multinational corporations. It would therefore be much
more difficult to create a waste generator cartel.
Third, CFCs comprise a small class of molecules. Wastes, on the
other hand, are highly heterogeneous.117 They are therefore more diffi-
cult to characterize and keep track of in commerce, increasing the like-
lihood that they will be 'lost.' A cumbersome permit system like the
Basel Convention's, with no economic incentives for compliance, may
exacerbate the 'waste loss' problem.
Each of these aspects of waste economics, however, can be turned
into a compliance incentive. Waste usually has negative value, but envi-
ronmentally sound disposal sites are scarce and, thus, have positive
value. Waste generators may be numerous, but relatively few countries
import wastes, and these states could form an importers' cartel. The
cartel could 'sell' a single valuable item-the right to import waste.
One alternative, then, for an international waste trade control system
would be to establish a world market in tradable waste import rights.
The amount of rights distributed on the world market would be fixed.
An international entity (e.g., UNEP) could establish the initial amount
of rights, calculated as a percentage of global waste exports in a desig-
nated base year."8 The unit value of rights could be expressed in terms
of a weighted measurement that takes account of waste volume,
weight, and toxicity.1 9
UNEP would distribute shares of the rights among prospective im-
porting countries. Exporting countries would then have to purchase
from the importing countries the right to import a given shipment of
waste.1 80 The world price of import rights would rise because world
demand for waste disposal sites would be increasing while the supply of
disposal rights under the system remained constant. Importing coun-
tries could use the proceeds from their sales of import rights to improve
waste management domestically or for other purposes. Provisions to
177. Compare Montreal Protocol, supra note 7, Annex A (listing chemical formu-
lae of eight controlled substances) with BASEL CONVENTION, supra note 27, Annexes I,
II & III (listing 47 categories and 14 characteristics of wastes).
178. The rights would be created for waste having negative value in international
trade. Where the waste has positive value, e.g., for recycling and metals recovery, mar-
ket forces obviate the need for additional tradeable rights.
179. Such a system would require development of uniform measurement standards,
a difficult but not impossible task, and one which could lead to better understanding of
the scope of the global waste problem.
180. The net effect would be to monetize disposal sites in importing countries, pres-
ently an undervalued resource.
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stimulate research and transfer of technology could also be included to
enhance improvement of importing countries' technical capacities.
Countries having prohibited imports could sell their rights to countries
wishing to increase their share of the import market.
To spur source reduction, the parties could agree to reduce the pool
of available disposal rights over a period of years. As the supply of
disposal rights diminished, their value on the world market would in-
crease, further favoring source reduction. Black marketeering would be
discouraged, because the legal market for import rights would com-
mand the highest prices.
Such provisions could provide more economic incentive for compli-
ance than those adopted at Basel. Additionally, such an approach could
increase the measurability and transparency of the waste transport con-
trols. The political climate of the Basel negotiations, however, made it
difficult to propose a market-oriented approach. Thus, the Convention,
bare of economic incentives, contains little to foster compliance or elim-
inate corruption in the waste trade.
3. International Trade in Chemicals
a. History
In May 1989, the UNEP Governing Council adopted the Amended
London Guidelines for the Exchange of Information on Chemicals in
International Trade.81l Under the guidelines, a country of export
should not allow shipment of any dangerous chemical, i.e., one which is
banned or severely restricted under any participating country's national
legislation, without the importing country's prior informed consent
(PIC).' 82 The Governing Council began looking at the problem of trade
in dangerous chemicals in 1977, when it urged governments to ensure
that chemicals unacceptable for domestic use were not exported with-
out the knowledge and consent of the importing country. 8 3 The GC did
not identify the subject as one for legal development, however, until
1982, when the Montevideo Programme recommended that UNEP de-
velop guidelines T8 as a first step toward a global convention.' 83
By 1985, a working group of legal and technical experts had devel-
oped the Provisional Notification Scheme for Banned and Severely Re-
181. Supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing the Amended London
Guidelines).
182. Id.
183. See UNEP GC Decision 85(V), supra note 69.
184. MONTEVIDEO PROGRAMME, supra note 17, at 6.
185. Id.
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stricted Chemicals.'8 6 Under this scheme, each participating country
was to designate a national authority to receive notifications of control
actions, i.e., actions exporting countries take to ban or severely restrict
chemicals domestically. 87 The national authority also was to receive
notifications of export of such chemicals.188
The scheme did not, however, require the exporting country to pro-
vide export notifications before an export occurred. 189 Furthermore, ex-
port notification would only occur for a given chemical if the exporting
country had banned or severely restricted it. Exporting countries which
had never regulated a chemical because they had no domestic demand
for it and exporting countries with lax domestic regulation escaped the
notification provisions.
In 1985 the Governing Council voted to reconstitute the working
group and develop the provisional scheme into guidelines.90 Some ex-
porting countries, pressured by their chemical industries, refused to al-
low PIC in the resulting London Guidelines for the Exchange of Infor-
mation on Chemicals in International Trade.'"' Developing countries
and NGOs, however, continued to press the issue. In 1987, the Gov-
erning Council directed that the London Guidelines be amended to in-
corporate PIC "and other modalities which could usefully supplement
the Guidelines."' 92 Twelve years of opposition to PIC ended in 1989,
when chemical exporting countries finally agreed to include PIC in the
186. The Provisional Notification Scheme for Banned and Severely Restricted
Chemicals, U.N. Doc. UNEP/WG.1 12/5 (1985), reprinted in BANNED AND SEVERELY
RESTRICTED CHEMICALS, UNEP GUIDELINES SERIES No. 6, supra note 10.
187. Id. paras. 3 & 5.
188. Id. paras. 4 & 5.
189. Id. para. 6(b). The scheme stated:
[P]rovision of information regarding exports should take place at the time of the
first export following the control action, and should recur in the case of any sig-
nificant development of new information or condition surrounding the control ac-
tion. It is the intention that, in so far as possible, the information should be
provided prior to export, but it is recognized that this may not always be possi-
ble, and that the procedures of the country of export should not be such as to
delay or control the export.
Id. (emphasis added)
190. UNEP GC Decision 13/18, supra note 49, at pt. III(B).
191. London Guidelines for the Exchange of Information Chemicals International
Trade, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC.14/17, Annex IV, reprinted in EXCHANGE OF INFORMA-
TION ON CHEMICALS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE, UNEP GUIDELINES SERIES No. 10,
supra note 10; see Decision 14/27 of the Governing Council of UNEP (June 17, 1987)
[hereinafter UNEP GC Decision 14/27] (adopting the Guidelines), reprinted in UNEP
GC Fourteenth Session Report, supra note 36, at 79. The anti-PIC group did not in-
clude the Netherlands, which had enacted a national PIC scheme for its chemical
exports.
192. See UNEP GC Decision 14/27, supra note 191, at operative para. 3(a) (call-
ing on UNEP to amend the guidelines to incorporate PIC).
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Amended London Guidelines for Exchange of Information on Chemi-
cals in International Trade.1 13
b. Legal strategy
Early on in the development of the Provisional Notification
Scheme,194 UNEP identified the major interest groups and the techni-
cal, legal, and political issues surrounding chemicals trade. Developing
countries, with NGO support, pressed for PIC as a means of preventing
exporting countries from dumping unsafe and unwanted chemicals on
markets ill equipped to handle them.195 Exporting countries, with in-
dustry support, opposed PIC on the ground that obtaining consent prior
to every shipment would generate too much paperwork. These states
argued that the best way for countries to control unwanted imports was
to develop national registration schemes. 9 Exporting countries and in-
dustry also took the position that PIC would run afoul of GATT. Tech-
nical experts expressed concern about how PIC would deal with differ-
ent formulations of a given pesticide, some of which might be banned,
while others were not.197
UNEP took the position that PIC could be particularly useful for
countries that had not yet developed national regulatory schemes.108
PIC would not generate much paperwork if it simply asked each coun-
try to announce its position on importation of listed chemicals, instead
of requiring the country to make a new PIC decision for each proposed
shipment of chemicals. 99 Furthermore, PIC should not depend on the
193. Amended London Guidelines, supra note 30.
194. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text (discussing the development of
the Provisional Notification Scheme).
195. Cf. Amended London Guidelines, supra note 30, at intro., para. 8 (stating
that the goal of Guidelines is to help developing countries avoid serious and costly
health and environmental mistakes due to ignorance of chemical risks).
196. Cf id. para. 5 (stating that the Guidelines should assist states in developing
national legislation).
197. Cf. id., Annex II, para. 2 (calling for the establishment of an expert group to
review the problems of acutely hazardous pesticide formulations). The situation is com-
plex, because formulation of a particular pesticide may take place in a country of ex-
port, import, or elsewhere, while a large number of different formulations may be used.
Additionally, the exporting country may ban or severely restrict some formulations
while others are not restricted, and those that are not restricted may nevertheless pose
a hazard under the local conditions of the country of import.
198. Report of the Second Session of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on
Prior Informed Consent and Other Modalities to Supplement the London Guidelines
for the Exchange of Information on Chemicals in International Trade, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/PIC.WG.2/4 at 2, para. 6 (New York, Feb. 16, 1989).
199. Id. at 2, para. 7 (advocating notification-linked rather than shipment-linked
decision making).
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vagary of whether the sending country had banned or severely re-
stricted the chemical at home. Instead, a PIC system should take ac-
count of all countries' chemicals legislation.2"' GATT posed no real
problem, because Article XX(b) allows trade controls for health and
environmental purposes as long as the controls are not applied in a dis-
criminatory manner."'
c. Results
The Amended London Guidelines for the Exchange of Information
on Chemicals in International Trade phase in PIC gradually. 02 UNEP
is to develop an alert list of chemicals that ten or more countries have
banned or severely restricted for health or environmental reasons, as
defined in the guidelines. UNEP is to circulate this list, together with
technical guidance documents,20 3 to participating governments for their
review and decision on importation of the listed chemicals. 0 4
Countries should register their PIC decisions with UNEP. UNEP, in
turn, will make the decisions available to all countries. As a next step,
UNEP will review chemicals that five to nine countries have banned,
and add to the alert list those chemicals which meet the guidelines defi-
nitions.20 5 An expert group will consider the problem of listing acutely
hazardous pesticide formulations.20 8
It is the function of the designated national authority in each export-
ing country to ensure, within its authority, that exports do not occur
contrary to the PIC decisions of importing countries.20 7 If an importing
country fails to indicate its PIC decision on a particular chemical, the
status quo with respect to importation of that chemical shall
200. See id. (supporting eventual introduction of PIC for each chemical when any
country had banned or severely restricted it).
201. GATT, supra note 4, art. XX(b).
202. Amended London Guidelines, supra note 30, pt. I, paras. 1(g), l(h) & 5; pt.
II, para. 7; and pt. II, paras. 12.a.iv, 12.b.vii. & 12.c.iii.
203. Id., Annex III. The guidance documents should include the reasons for the
ban or severe restriction of the chemical, the chemical's environmental fate, recom-
mended controls, and available alternatives, including integrated pest management and
nonchemical alternatives. Id. The guidelines also call for provision of technical assis-
tance and training to countries with less developed chemical regulatory programmes.
Id. pt. III, para. 15.
204. Id. Annex II, para. 1.
205. Id. Countries taking additional control actions to ban or severely restrict
chemicals should notify UNEP, which will disseminate the information to all partici-
pating countries. Id. Annex II, para. 1. This will permit participating countries to reg-
ister their PIC decisions on those chemicals. Id.
206. Id. paras. 2, 3, & 4.
207. Id. pt. II, para. 12.c.iv.
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continue.208
The Amended London Guidelines remain a "soft law" solution to the
problem of trade in dangerous chemicals. Should the GC decide to pro-
ceed with a convention in this field,209 UNEP will have an opportunity
to add compliance incentives and efficacy monitoring mechanisms to
the PIC regime.
Only one country in the world, the United States, has a long estab-
lished chemical export notification scheme. The United States experi-
ence indicates the need for additional incentives to boost compliance.
Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA), 10 the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) must notify foreign governments when United States pesticide
registrations are cancelled.21' Foreign buyers of unregistered pesticides
must sign statements indicating that they understand that the products
they are buying are not registered for use in the United States. 2 ' Ad-
ditionally, United States sellers must maintain records of the foreign
buyer statements and provide copies of the statements to the EPA.21
A recent General Accounting Office (GAO) investigation, however,
found that EPA received copies of foreign buyer statements for only
one quarter of United States unregistered pesticides sold overseas. "
United States pesticide exports constitute one quarter of the world pes-
208. Id. para. 7.3.d (defining "status quo").
209. See UNEP GC Decision 15/30, supra note 30, at 70 (noting that the Gov-
erning Council has deferred the question of development of a chemicals convention
until its sixteenth session).
210. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C.
§§ 136a-y (1988). The Netherlands enacted a voluntary PIC scheme in 1986 and com-
pliance experience to date has been positive. Report of the Ad Hoe Working Group of
Experts on Prior Informed Consent and Other Modalities to Supplement the London
Guidelines for the Exchange of Information on Chemicals in International Trade (Da-
kar, Sept. 19-23, 1988), U.N. Doc. UNEP/WG.188/5, para. 20 (Oct. 10, 1988);
Points for Consideration by the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on Prior Informed
Consent and Other Modalities to Supplement the London Guidelines for the Exchange
of Information on Chemicals in International Trade, U.N. Doc. UNEP/WG.181/2,
para. 6 (May 25, 1988).
211. FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136o(b) (1988).
212. Id. § 1360(a)(2); 40 C.F.R. § 169.2(h)(3) (1988).
213. Id. (h)(1), (3)(i); EPA Policy Statement, 45 Fed. Reg. 50, 274 (1980); See
Pesticide Export Policy Review and Labeling Requirements for Pesticides, Devices, and
Pesticide Active Ingredients Intended for Export; Proposed Policy Statements, 55 Fed.
Reg. 4956 (1990) (proposing to revise EPA's pesticide export policies, including, inter
alia, revisions to bring U.S. activities into conformity with UNEP's PIC procedures).
214. General Accounting Office, Pesticides: Export of Unregistered Pesticides Is
Not Adequately Monitored by EPA, GAO, RCED-89-128 (Apr. 1989). The report
notes that pesticides in developing countries cause roughly one million human poison-
ings annually and pose a significant threat to wildlife. Id. See generally EPA Found
Lax on Poison Reports, DEFENDERS, July/Aug. 1989, at 5 (reporting on GAO investi-
gation of compliance monitoring under FIFRA).
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ticide market.216 Of the United States pesticides exported, one quarter
are not registered for domestic sale.216 The United States scheme thus
appears to be driving trade in unregistered pesticides underground.
PIC might be more effective if it used economic incentives to channel
trade away from unsafe chemicals. For example, in addition to provid-
ing an alert list of dangerous chemicals, PIC could utilize a 'clean list'
of environmentally benign substitutes. Participating governments could
nominate for inclusion on the clean list those products, methodologies,
integrated pest management and intercropping techniques which they
have found to be environmentally sound alternatives to alert list chemi-
cals. Such an approach could stimulate competition to produce environ-
mentally sound products and enhance transfer of information and tech-
nology. In addition, changes in market share of clean list and alert list
products could, over time, provide a crude measure of the effectiveness
of the PIC procedures.217
III. UNEP'S PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONVENTIONS:
BIODIVERSITY AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
The UNEP Governing Council has recently called for development
of new international legal instruments on preservation of biological di-
versity 218 and global climate change. 219 In the field of biodiversity, the
failure of existing legal instruments to take account of economic con-
siderations led the Governing Council to direct UNEP to consider "the
economic dimension, including, inter alia, the question of adequate ma-
chinery for financial transfers from those who benefit from the ex-
ploitation of biological diversity ...to the owners and managers of
biological resources. 22 ° In the field of global climate change, the per-
215. Id.
216. Id. at 6. On occasion the EPA also fails to notify foreign governments that a
United States manufacturer has voluntarily withdrawn a pesticide registration. Id.
217. A clean list could build on the work underway in many European countries to
develop a competitive market in environmental friendly products. For example, CFC-
free spray cans produced by some European companies bear a blue label with the
words, sans gaz considr nuisible pour l'ozone. Work on developing competitive mar-
kets in environmentally friendly products in the United States has only recently begun.
See Rothenberg, Advertising New Agency Devoted to the Environment, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 22, 1990, at D22 (noting the establishment of what may be the first U.S. advertis-
ing agency for environmentally sensitive products and services, and reporting that the
Wal-Mart retail chain has begun tagging products it believes to be environmentally
harmless).
218. UNEP GC Decision 15/34, supra note 34.
219. UNEP GC Decision 15/36, supra note 24.
220. UNEP GC Decision 15/34, supra note 34, para. 4.
[VOL. 5:351386
THE ROLE OF UNEP
vasive nature of the control measures under consideration virtually
mandates attention to economic implications.
The two principal existing conventions on biodiversity, the 1973 Con-
vention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora22' and the 1979 Convention on Conservation of Migratory
Species of Wild Animals, 222 establish permit systems in an effort to
control trade in endangered species. Neither contains any economic in-
centives to foster compliance.
Under CITES, a state of export may issue an export permit for a
specimen of a protected species only if the state's authorities are satis-
fied that the export will not be detrimental to the survival of that spe-
cies, and if the authorities are satisfied that the specimen was not ob-
tained in contravention of the laws of the exporting state.2 3 For the
more seriously endangered species, an import certificate is also
required. 24
A large number of states participate in CITES, 225 but membership is
not broad enough to provide effective protection for many species. Be-
cause the convention fails to prohibit trade with nonparties,220 it inad-
vertently creates legal entrepots of uncontrolled trafficking in endan-
gered species. Unscrupulous ivory dealers, for example, ship poached
elephant tusks to carving factories in nonparty states. The dealers can
then legally re-export the carved material to countries that are CITES
members but only prohibit import of raw, not worked, ivory. Traffic in
poached ivory has decimated elephant herds, CITES notwith-
standing.2 27
CMS follows the CITES model. Where CITES requires trade per-
mits, CMS prohibits (with certain exceptions) the taking of the most
endangered migratory species, and encourages habitat improvement
and co-operative agreements to protect all listed species . 2 8 Like
221. CITES, supra note 31.
222. CMS, supra note 32.
223. CITES, supra note 31, arts. 2-6 (specifying procedures governing issuance of
export permits).
224. Id. arts. 3 & 4 (specifying that import permits are to be issued only if authori-
ties in the state of imports have advised that the import would not serve purposes detri-
mental to the survival of the species).
225. See Register of Treaties, supra note 7, at 117-19 (stating that ninety-six
states and the European Community participate in the CITES regime).
226. CITES, supra note 31, art. 10.
227. See Trail of Shame, supra note 3, at 35 & 38-39 (describing how CITES has
often been circumvented). The recent (October 1989) listing of the elephant as a most
endangered species under CITES, together with recently announced bans on ivory im-
port by a number of countries, may ameliorate the situation.
228. CMS, supra note 32, arts. 3-5. CMS has a current membership of 27 states
and the European Community. Register of Treaties, supra note 7, at 167-68.
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CITES, however, CMS offers no economic incentives to encourage peo-
ple who live in the vicinity of sensitive habitats to protect endangered
species.
A number of national and international agencies and organizations
have already done considerable work on developing mechanisms that
preserve biodiversity while at the same time provide increased eco-
nomic and social benefits to people who live in the vicinity of the bi-
odiversity reserves. 29 UNEP should build upon such work in develop-
ing its global convention on biodiversity and should include incentives
to combat corruption that threatens species' survival.
In the area of global climate change, UNEP is working with WMO
and other agencies to develop sound scientific targets and strategies for
consideration in the context of a framework convention. 230 The GC did
not direct UNEP to develop control protocols for particular greenhouse
gases.231 In a sense, however, one such instrument already exists. Inso-
far as CFCs and halons not only deplete the ozone layer, but also con-
tribute to the greenhouse effect, 232 the Montreal Protocol 233 functions
as a climate protection measure.
For other greenhouse and trace gases,234 consensus on control mea-
sures will be harder to obtain. CFC emissions arise from a narrow
range of specialized products like aerosols, air conditioners, foam pack-
229. See, e.g., W. REID, BANKROLLING SUCCESSES: A PORTFOLIO OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS (Environmental Policy Institute and National Wildlife Feder-
ation 1988) (reviewing projects utilizing such tools).
230. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (examining UNEP cooperation
with the WMO).
231. See UNEP GC Decision 15/36, supra note 24.
232. See Vienna Report, supra note 23, at 1, para. 2 (noting that scientific research
has confirmed the link between ozone depletion, climate change, and global warming);
Montreal Report, supra note Ill, at 6-7, para. 19 (noting statement of Dr. Robert
Watson, Chief Scientist in the U.S. delegation, that CFCs and halons are greenhouse
gases with high greenhouse warming potentials); see also N. ROSENBERG, CLIMATE
CHANGE: A PRIMER 14 (Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C., 1984) (noting
that CFC-catalyzed reduction of stratospheric ozone results in increased ultraviolet ir-
radiation and consequent warming of the Earth's surface). The parties to the Vienna
Convention and the Montreal Protocol agreed at their first meeting to undertake fur-
ther work within the framework of the two instruments to ascertain the greenhouse gas
potentials of the substances controlled under the protocol. Vienna Report, supra note
23, at 9; Montreal Report, supra note 111.
233. Montreal Protocol, supra note 7.
234. See N. ROSENBERG, supra note 232, at 14 (discussing greenhouse and trace
gases). These include carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxides, tropospheric ozone, and
carbon monoxide. Id.; JAMIESON, MANAGING THE FUTURE: PUBLIC POLICY, SCIENTIFIC
UNCERTAINTY, AND GLOBAL WARMING 4 (1988) (Working paper available at Center
for Values and Social Policy, Department of Philosophy, University of Colorado at
Boulder) (listing greenhouse gases); see also Newell, Reichle, & Seiler, Carbon Mon-
oxide and the Burning Earth, SCi. AM., Oct. 1989, at 58-64 (discussing the role of
carbon monoxide).
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aging, and solvents for cleaning computer circuits. The other green-
house gases, by contrast, come from activities which constitute the very
fabric of daily life the world over.
Humans drive cars, burn fields and fossil fuels, clear forests, graze
cattle, and grow rice. These are the kinds of quotidian activities that
are probably contributing to the current buildup of greenhouse gases.233
They cannot be controlled by simple mandate, particularly an interna-
tionally unenforceable one. Efforts to control global climate change will
need to incorporate economic incentives if they are to have any hope of
success.
If and when climate changes occur, some nations will likely emerge
as economic "winners" and others as economic "losers. 236 Control ef-
forts should therefore consider how the economic behavior of prospec-
tive winners and losers may change over time. 3 The controls should
build in flexibility to account for changing economic circumstances.
Uncertainty about the nature, mechanisms, timing, and regional effects
of global climate change heightens the need for flexible incentive sys-
tems and for efficacy monitoring mechanisms, so that controls can be
readily adjusted in light of new scientific information. 38
Marketable greenhouse gas emission rights and credits, traded
through an international emissions credit bank, could provide a flexible
and monitorable global system of economic incentives for controlling a
range of greenhouse gas-generating activities.239 A central body could
create the initial amount of rights, distribute a base amount to all
countries, and deposit the remainder in the emissions credit bank. The
amount of rights created, distributed and deposited would be calculated
on the basis of best available scientific information, taking into account
the needs of developing countries, in particular those (e.g. island states)
that global climate changes are likely seriously and adversely to affect.
Public and private sector entities wishing to obtain additional emis-
235. See N. ROSENBERG, supra note 232, at 10; Newell, supra note 234, at 63-64
(discussing activities that contribute to greenhouse gases).
236. JAMIESON, supra note 234, at 13, citing Glantz, Politics and the Air Around
Us: International Policy Action on, Atmospheric Pollution by Trace Gases (COlTrace
Gases-Induced Global Warming), in SOCIETAL RESPONSES TO REGIONAL CLIMATE
CHANGE: FORECASTING BY ANALOGY (1988).
237. See JAMIESON, supra note 234, at 14 (distinguishing between policy responses
to a warmer world and policy responses to the possibility of transition to a warmer
world).
238. See id. at 9, 14-15 (noting the scientific uncertainty of climate changes and
effects).
239. See A. BLINDER, supra note 8, at 157-58 (noting that marketable pollution
permits can provide greater flexibility and better performance monitoring than other
pollution control instruments).
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sions rights for polluting activities would have to purchase the rights
from the bank, thus providing the bank with an initial source of capital.
The bank could use this capital to finance loans to entities wishing to
undertake pollution control and other off-setting activities such as re-
forestation programs. Completion of such activities would entitle the
entities to receive tradeable emission credits.
The central body responsible for creating the rights could establish
initial prices for the rights. The bank could serve as the clearinghouse
for the emissions trading market created. The central body could meet
regularly to review the effectiveness of the system in light of new scien-
tific information and world market activity.
Local branches of the bank could serve two key functions. First, they
could encourage the kind of grass-roots participation that will be criti-
cal to the success of efforts to control greenhouse gas-generating activi-
ties. Second, they could, through the medium of electronic fund trans-
fers, enable a truly international control effort to function efficiently
and effectively.
Suppose, for example, that a village in a developing country seeks to
introduce fuel-saving cookstoves. The village could borrow money from
the local branch of the emissions credit bank to purchase the cook-
stoves. If the cookstove program is successful, the village would earn
emissions credits. The villagers could then sell these credits on the
world market, asking the bank to broker the transaction. If, for exam-
ple, a power company in another country is seeking additional emis-
sions rights to build a new plant, it could apply to its local branch of
the emissions credit bank to buy the village's emissions credits. The
bank could use the proceeds of the sale to pay off the villagers' cook-
stove loan, with any remaining profits going directly to the village.
Such a proposal is admittedly ambitious. The challenge posed by global
climate change, however, may demand ambitious solutions.
CONCLUSION
Since its inception, the United Nations Environment Programme has
contributed greatly to the development of international environmental
law. Its approach has been first to formulate scientific positions, then
develop legal strategies, and in the process carefully build political sup-
port. An important component of this approach has been UNEP's ne-
gotiation of 'soft law' guidelines or principles as a prelude to the devel-
opment of binding international law.
Historically, UNEP has negotiated legal instruments which seek to
place direct controls on environmentally harmful activities. In the ab-
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sence of any global entity capable of enforcing such controls, however,
UNEP has begun to consider how to build into its agreements eco-
nomic incentives that favor environmental compliance. UNEP has also
begun to develop mechanisms for evaluating the effectiveness of envi-
ronmental control regimes. UNEP's landmark 1987 Montreal Protocol
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer took an important first
step in this direction. The 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal,
however, retreated to a strategy of direct controls. As UNEP's Gov-
erning Council has recently called for conventions on preservation of
biological diversity and global climate change, and the Council will
soon consider whether to proceed with a convention on international
trade in dangerous chemicals, UNEP has the opportunity to include
economic incentives and monitoring mechanisms in its further develop-
ment of international environmental law.
